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ABSTRACT

SCANDINAVIA AFTER THE FALL OF THE KALMAR UNION: A STUDY OF
SCANDINAVIAN RELATIONS, 1523-1536

Kenneth Steffensen
Department of History
Master of Arts

As the Kalmar Union came to an end in 1523 the balance of control and power
shifted in Scandinavia. Due to the tyranny of Christian II, Sweden rebelled and broke
away under the leadership of Gustav Vasa while Norway remained in union with
Denmark. Although Danes and Norwegians shared common traits and identifiers;
including religion, language and cultural aspects, they had a stronger sense of identity to
their own country rather to the union. Because of their political and economic influence
in Norway prior to 1523, Danish nobles had increased Norwegian’s sense of being
Norwegians rather then Danish.
Frederik I, who ruled from 1523 to 1533, did all in his power to increase his own
and Denmark’s control of Norway in this period. In clear violation of his Norwegian
Coronation Charter of 1524, Frederik placed prominent Danish nobles in central political
and military positions in Norway. Frederik also by-passed the Norwegian National
5

Council in many matters that rightfully should have been handled by the council rather
then the King. After Frederik I’s death in 1533 the Danish-Norwegian throne remained
vacant until 1536. Within this interregnum a civil war broke out in Denmark, followed by
the Count’s War, instigated by the Hanseatic town of Lübeck, which sought to place
Christian II back on the throne. This war, which ended in 1536, brought an end to
Lübeck’s Baltic dominion and placed Christian III, son of Frederik I, as king of
Denmark-Norway. Once in power, Christian III obliterated the Norwegian Council, thus
removing Norway’s political influence in the union permanently.
Although Sweden officially broke away, it maintained a diplomatic relations with
Denmark-Norway. In fact, Gustav Vasa made efforts to strengthen their diplomatic
during Frederik I’s reign. The outbreak of the Count’s War in 1534 rallied the former
members of the Kalmar Union to cooperate militarily. Together they defeated Lübeck
and secured a peaceful relationship between Sweden and Denmark-Norway which lasted
until 1563.
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Introduction

The balance of power and control shifted in Scandinavia as the Kalmar Union,
which had joined Denmark, Norway and Sweden together under one king since 1397,
crumbled in 1523. As the union fell apart, Sweden broke free and crowned a new king.
Norway, however, remained united with Denmark under the Danish king. As the Kalmar
Union ended, then, so did 126 years of a unified Scandinavia. Competition and
aggression in the race for interests in Baltic trade also flavored the early sixteenth
century. The Hanseatic town of Lübeck flexed its muscles during this period and
instigated the Count’s War, which lasted from 1534 to 1536. The Protestant Reformation
also emerged in this era as a major influence. Although historians and other scholars have
discovered a great deal of information about Scandinavia in the early sixteenth century,
there are gaps in certain areas of history. For instance, there is a lack of historical insight
into the relationships between these three kingdoms after the fall of the Kalmar Union.
This does not mean that historians have never written about this topic, but it is possible,
through the source material available, to take a closer look at issues that prevailed within
this period in history.
This thesis, then, will present a more detailed portrait of the sources than
presently available. One central argument is that Denmark, through the actions of
Frederik I, overpowered Norway by placing prominent Danes in politically and militarily
significant positions. By doing so, Frederik pushed aside the Norwegian council, clearly
violating the promises he had made in his Norwegian charter. The discussion of the role
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of Frederik’s men will also provide better insight into how these men used their positions
to further their own interests and how their actions alienated them from their Norwegian
subjects, partly because they were Danish rather then Norwegian. Overall the discussion
of Denmark and Norway will demonstrate that Frederik I’s efforts to undermine
Norwegian rights succeeded and were completed by his son, Christian III, who
eliminated Norway’s political influence. This thesis will, in as much detail as possible,
show how Denmark managed to remove Norway’s political influence within a thirteen
year period.
The relationship between Denmark and Sweden, bitter enemies in the 1520s, will
also be discussed. Regarding this relationship, this thesis will argue that the leaders of
these former enemies, Christian III and Gustav Vasa, developed a closer relationship
during the 1530s, due much to their mutual and cordial cooperation and assistance in the
days of the Count’s War. This cooperation, which did result in victory over Lübeck, more
importantly established peace between the two countries, which lasted until new
leadership emerged in the 1560s. By this time, Denmark and Norway had made the
necessary changes to complete the Protestant Reformation.
Before entering into the main section of the thesis, it is necessary to take a look at
what other historians have written and contributed concerning Scandinavia in the period
in question.
Historiography
As the majority of this thesis will discuss the relationship between Denmark and
Norway, this historiography will first present a discussion of works that have contributed
to this study. Works that deal with the history of Sweden and Gustav Vasa will follow.
9

Caspar Paludan-Müller’s Grevens Feide constitutes the only major work
dedicated solely to the Count’s War and surrounding events. Grevens Feide was
originally published in Copenhagen in 1853 and 1854 and then reissued in 1971 and is
only available in Danish. This two-volume, nine hundred page work, is impressive in its
scope because of its in-depth coverage of the many facets of the Count’s War. This work
is essential for anyone with an interest in researching the Count’s War; at least for those
competent in older Danish. In volume one, Paludan-Müller portrayed the buildup before
the war with a strong focus on Denmark and Lübeck.1 He wrote about the Baltic struggle
between Lübeck and the Netherlands, the death of Frederik I and the political unrest that
followed. This volume also included a discussion of Gustav Vasa’s relationship to
Lübeck prior to the Count’s War. Perhaps most important is his treatment of the
relationship between Denmark and Sweden. He offered insight into the nature of the
agreement of assistance in case of foreign threats made in 1524, and included details
regarding the number of ships and soldiers involved, along with details on how military
aid should be financed.2
The second volume of Grevens Feide contained an account of the last phase of the
Count’s War, including the siege of Copenhagen, 1535-1536.3 This volume also
discussed Norway during the reign of Frederik I and the Count’s War. He argued that the
most significant influence of the events surrounding the Count’s War was that Norway
1

Capsar Paludan- Müller, Grevens Feide vol. 1 (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Bo og Arvinger,
1853). Repr., Copenhagen 1971.
2

Ibid., 180-181.

3

Paludan- Müller, Grevens Feide vol. 2 (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Bo og Arvinger, 1854).
Reissued in Copenhagen 1971.
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lost influence and became more subjugated to Denmark.4 However, he never included
any specific details of how Fredrik dealt with Norway and how he often bypassed the
Norwegian council. Paludan-Müller discussed the role of Frederik I’s Danish men in
Norway, including Vincent Lunge, Henrik Krummedige, and Esge Bille. He wrote that
because Frederik I, who never personally traveled to Norway, had so many Danish men
in Norway he ensured that the two kingdoms remained united after his death in 1533.5 He
did include some coverage about the dealings of these Danes in Norway, including
Vincent Lunge’s important political position and his many dealings with Olaf
Engelbrektsson, Archbishop in Trondheim6 He also mentioned the feud between Vincent
Lunge and Henrik Krummedige. However, Paludan-Müller failed to provide a detailed
account of their dealings in Norway and did not consider how their influence and
behavior might have affected Norwegian attitudes towards the Danish presence.
The author dealt with the political situation in Denmark and Norway after
Frederik’s Death in 1533 and how the Norwegian council never managed to travel to
Copenhagen to join its Danish counterpart in electing a new king. In Norway, some
members of the council, including Danish nobleman Vincent Lunge, declared Duke
Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, son of Fredrik I, as king. The remainder of the council
later joined in this decision, including Olaf Engelbrektsson.7 Paludan-Müller also wrote

4

Ibid., 2-3.

5

Ibid., 2, 8.

6

Ibid., 31-33.

7

Ibid., 63-65, 75.

11

about the 1536 revolt in Trondheim under the leadership of Engelbrektsson.8 Despite its
age, Grevens Feide stands as an important work in regard to the Count’s War and
surrounding issues in Scandinavia and the Baltic. Although Paludan-Müller dedicated
some space to discussing the relationship between Denmark and Norway, his major focus
was on the many players and elements of the Count’s War. Despite their age, these
volumes have been valuable to this thesis.
In 1968-69, Erling Ladewig Petersen featured an article in the Danish Historisk
Tidsskrift about the relationship between Denmark and Norway between 1523 and 1533.9
Petersen offered a thorough background of the last days of Christian II’s reign before he
actually got into his discussion about Danish nobleman Henrik Krummedige and DanishNorwegian relations, between 1523 and 1533. In fact, Petersen spent the first half of his
article dealing with other issues rather then with the actual topic of the article. He
dedicated a vast amount of space to discussing dealings in Denmark and Sweden under
Christian II. As a whole Petersen’s article was important because few others had
addressed similar issues in the past, especially his treatment of Krummedige and his
actions in Norway. His main argument was that the economic interests of Danish nobles
like Krummedige, who owned a significant amount of land in Norway, contributed to the
incorporation of Norway in 1536. Petersen wrote about how Krummedige and other
Danes, like Vincent Lunge and Esge Bille, used their influence in Norway to further

8

Ibid., 258-263.

9

Erling Ladewig Petersen, “Henrik Krummedige og Norge: Studier over Danmarks Forhold til
Norge 1523-1533,” Dansk Historisk Tidsskrift, vol. 12, 3 (1968-1969).
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personal economic interests through business and trade.10 He also wrote about
Krummedige’s feud with Vincent Lunge and his efforts to make Frederik I help restore
his Norwegian estates.11 Although Petersen’s article offered many useful insights, it
certainly contributed to this thesis by suggesting that Danish nobles in this period were
more interested in their financial positions rather then political issues of the time.
In 1980, Danish historians Kai Hørby and Mikael Venge contributed their insights
to a multivolume work on Danish history.12 Their volume covered the period from1340 to
1648 and provided insight into the nature of the Scandinavia union from its beginnings.
One significant contribution of Hørby and Venge were their detailed historiographies and
discussion of available literature in various fields of historical study. For example, they
dedicated a significant section to the discussion of historian’s treatments of Christian II
and throughout the text they tied in what other historians had contributed on various
topics, adding their own assessments. Their overall argument, in regards to Denmark and
Norway, was that the central issue for Denmark under Frederik I and after his death in
1533 was to keep a firm control over Norway. Frederik managed to do this by placing
Danes in charge of Norway’s fortresses, which violated his Norwegian charter.13
Although they discussed Frederik’s policies, they failed to offer any details surrounding
his violation of the charter when he placed Danes in charge of the Norwegian fortresses.

10

Ibid., 25-41.

11

Ibid., 51-61.

12

Kai Hørby and Mikael Venge, Danmarks Historie, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1980).

13

Ibid., 301-303.

13

Because of their brief and casual treatment of this topic there is definitely room to portray
this more carefully.
In 1987, Sverre Bagge and Knut Mykland published a work about the history of
Norway during the union with Denmark.14 This book looked at the historical setting
around the time prior to the Kalmar Union and continues until Norway split with
Denmark in 1814. Their main emphasis was to deal with internal developments within
Norway in this period and to determine Norway’s place in the state system. They
explained how Norway could not afford to have its own king in the 1390s and how a
union king was a better alternative.15 As a part of the discussion of the Kalmar Union,
these two authors portrayed the relatively weak position of the Norwegian nobility and
how Norway’s lack of influence stemmed from this and also from the country’s lack of a
strong economy.16
Bagge and Mykland also focused on the Norwegian society of the fifteenth and
early sixteenth centuries, including the role of farming and fishing. An important part of
their discussion was the Norwegian rebellions of the time, including the rebellion of Knut
Alvsson in 1501-1502, where they made an important contribution. They also wrote
about how Christian II levied heavy taxes on the Norwegians and how he helped to
tighten the Danish grip on Norway.17 They had, however, a considerably shorter coverage

14

Sverre Bagge and Knut Mykland, Norge i Dansketiden, trans. Ole Schierbeck (Copenhagen:
Politikens Forlag, 1987).
15

Ibid., 60.

16

Ibid., 16-17, 33-36.

17

Ibid., 72-76
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of Frederik I’s reign and the Count’s War. This discussion revolved around Olaf
Engelbrektsson’s influence in Norway and how he supported Christian II when he
returned to Norway in 1531, and they covered the Count’s War in a few short
paragraphs.18 Bagge and Mykland included no discussion of the influence of Danish
nobles in Norway at the time. They did, however, deal with Christian III’s efforts to
reduce Norway to a province in his charter of 1536. According to these authors, Christian
III secured the downfall of Norway’s political influence through what they saw as
something close to a coup.19 Overall, the work of Bagge and Mykland stands as an
important work on the history of Norway in the days of the Danish union. Their work
was impressive because of its broad insight into the many aspects that affected Norway
and Denmark’s union from 1380 to 1814.
In 1989, Alex Wittendorf contributed a volume dedicated to the entire sixteenth
century as a part of another multi-volume work on Denmark’s history.20 His overarching
argument in this volume was that the two most important events of the sixteenth century
were the emergence of the Reformation and Humanism which, in the long run, came to
have enormous consequences in Danish society.21 Overall the author gave a vivid account
of Danish society in the sixteenth century. He also discussed events surrounding the
Count’s War. Wittendorf argued that the civil war that began in Denmark just prior to the

18

Ibid., 78.

19

Ibid., 80.

20

Alex Wittendorf, Danmarks Historie, vol. 7 (Copenhagen: Nordisk Forlag, 1989).

21

Ibid., 12-14.
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Count’s War, started because Danish bishops refused to choose a king in 1533.22 In this
volume, Wittendorf presented one of the most detailed accounts of the Count’s War
found in a work of this kind. He covered the major players and events of the war and
included a discussion of how Christian III completed Denmark’s process of religious
reform. This is where he made his most significant assessments because few other works
had covered this was so carefully. His account focused solely on Denmark and Lübeck,
and was devoid of any discussion regarding the relationship between Denmark and
Norway during the sixteenth century. Despite this, Wittendorf’s volume represents an
important contribution to the study of Denmark in the sixteenth century.
Historian Øystein Rian has written a considerable amount on Norway’s history of
the sixteenth century. In 1995, he contributed to a multivolume work on the history of
Norway.23 Rian’s main arguments are that Norway was too weak and disconnected to
avoid the power and influence of the Danish monarchy.24 In his book, Rian confronted
issues surrounding Danish behavior in Norway. For instance, he mentioned how Hans
Mule, a Danish noble, pillaged and killed people in order to keep his position there. He
also wrote about some of the activities of Vincent Lunge and Henrik Krummedige,
especially the struggle over land holdings between these two Danes. Rian hints that
Frederik I often made decisions that affected Norway without consulting the Norwegian

22

Ibid., 177.

23

Øystein Rian, Norges Historie, vol. 5: den nye begynnlesen: 1520-1660 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug &

Co, 1995).
24

Ibid., 11.
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council and tried to tighten control by sending Danish nobles to Norway.25 He failed,
however, to discuss possible outcomes and effects of Danish behavior in Norway.
Christian II’s attack on Norway, along with how Archbishop Engelbrektsson and also
some farmers pledged their support to him, receives mention. Another issue that Rian
focuses on is Olaf Engelbrektsson and the revolt in Trondheim in 1536 and Christian III’s
response by sending soldiers to deal with this threat.26 He also writes about Christian’s
Norwegian charter, which denounced the influence of Norway’s council. Rian’s coverage
offers a relatively complete portrait of conditions in Norway under Frederik I and the
days of the Count’s War. However, his treatment of Frederik’s policies regarding Norway
lacks detail and never mentions the role of other Danes like Esge Bille and issues
surrounding Norway’s fortresses.
Rian made another contribution to the study of Scandinavia’s history in 1997, this
time along with Danish historian Esben Albrectsen. Together they wrote a two-volume
work on Denmark and Norway from 1380 to 1814. In fact, this work constitutes the only
work ever produced on this era of history as a cooperation between Danish and
Norwegian historians. The first volume penned by Esben Albrectsen covers the period
between 1380 and 1536.27 His main argument concerning Denmark-Norway in the 152030s was that the actions of Denmark made Norway’s position as an equal partner in the

25

Ibid., 15-19.

26

Ibid., 31-33.

27

Esben Albrectsen, Danmark-Norge 1380-1814, vol. 1: fællesskabet bliver til: 1380-1536 (Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget, 1997).
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union practically illusionary.28 Albrectsen wrote that Frederik I’s Norwegian charter was
unique because it stood separated from the Danish. The reason for this was that the
Norwegian council waited to make a decision on the question of Frederik’s position as
the next monarch, because its members wanted to make sure that Norway would remain
in control of its fortresses in Bergen and Oslo.29 He argued that Norway’s independence
at the time required that the Norwegian council should run the country along with the
king and that members of the council should be Norwegian.30
In order to secure his position as the new king of Denmark-Norway, Frederik
sent Henrik Krummedige and Vincent Lunge to Norway and these two Danes succeeded
in persuading the Norwegian council to support Frederik. Lunge, who quickly gained a
prominent political position in Norway, turned against Krummedige and persuaded the
council to banish him from the country. Albrectsen argued that Lunge made a political
mistake when he chose to support the Swedish rebel called daljunkeren. In violation of
his charter, Frederik sent additional Danes to Norway, including Mogens Gyldenstjerne
and Esge Bille, and put them in charge of the fortresses.31Albrectsen’s coverage of the
Count’s War was brief, offering a short summary of events, which includes
Engelbrekstsson’s revolt. Although Albrectsen dealt with many central issues of the time,
he failed to offer a close look at Frederik’s dealings with Norway and leaves out many
details regarding the relationship between Denmark and Norway at the time.
28

Ibid., 305.

29

Ibid., 316.

30

Ibid., 309.

31

Ibid., 318-320.
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Rian’s volume continued Albrectsen’s discussion by beginning with the coming
of Christian III and his charter of 1536, which dissolved the Norwegian council and made
Norway a province of Denmark. Rian’s central argument was that the main reason behind
the charter’s nature had to do with the fact that the Norwegian council had failed to live
up to its commitments, Olaf Engelbrektsson being the main player in this.32 Rian argued
that although Norway lost its place as a separate kingdom in the charter, Denmark kept it
quiet from the Norwegians and in official documents dealing with other countries,
Norway still appeared as a separate kingdom. Christian III claimed that he had the right
to inherit Norway under his rule and because the Danes had named him king of Denmark
he automatically also served as the king of Norway.33
In 2004, Knud J.V. Jespersen, published his book titled A history of Denmark,
which was an introductory guide to Danish history.34 The principle theme of his book
was to unveil how Denmark slowly disintegrated and reduced from what it was in 1500
until its present state. Jespersen’s overall argument was that modern day Denmark was
shaped by five hundred years of losing territories, internal upheavals, wars, new
production methods and more modern way of thinking. As an introductionary text, this
book offered useful insights into many elements in Denmark’s history, including the role
of the Danish Monarchs and the development of absolutism under Frederik III in the

32

Øystein Rian, Danmark-Norge 1380-1814, vol. 2: den aristokratiske fyrstestaten 1536-1648
(Oslo: Universitetesforlaget, 1997), 18-19.
33

Ibid., 23.

34

Knud J.V. Jespersen, A History of Denmark, trans. Ivan Hill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2004).
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seventeenth century.35 Jespersen portrayed the Danish revolution of March 1848 and the
development of the Danish welfare state. He also effectively presented the development
of the Danish economy, comparing the conditions of the old versus the new. His
treatments of events in interest for this thesis, however, were lacking. Although he
offered a useful insight into the Kalmar Union and struggle for trade domination in the
Baltic, he ignored to mention the Count’s War or anything about Scandinavian relations
in the early sixteenth century.
Since this thesis will include a discussion on the relationship between Denmark
and Sweden after the fall of the Kalmar Union, it is also necessary to consider some
works that deal with this subject. In his book, The Early Vasas: A History of Sweden
1523-1611, published in 1968, Michael Roberts dealt with the history of Gustav Vasa and
the Swedish kings that followed after him. The overall theme of Roberts’s work was the
Swedish Reformation and the purpose to provide an introduction to this topic.36
Roberts’s main argument revolved around the Swedish Reformation, but he still offered a
great deal about Gustav Vasa’s overall achievements, including how he transformed
Sweden from a vanquished state to be a respectable European power. He pointed out that
Vasa watched over his subjects tirelessly, discerning their strengths and weaknesses, and
that the “trader and the husbandman, no less then the bishop and the bailiff, were made to
feel at very instant that Sweden had now a king who was sovereign indeed.”37 He also
35

Ibid., 40-44.

36

Michael Roberts, The Early Vasas: A History of Sweden 1523-1611 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1968).
37

Ibid., 187.
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made a significant contribution regarding Eric XIV, Johan III and Karl IX and how the
Reformation progressed in Sweden until its completion in 1611. As the only English
book dealing with these issues in such grace and detail, Roberts’s book was and remains
an important contribution to this field of study.
In addition to this, Roberts described Gustav Vasa’s relationship with Lübeck,
how the Hansa town helped him to power and how Vasa struggled to pay his financial
obligations. With regard to the relationship between Vasa and Fredrik I, Roberts did not
include much information but mentioned how the two countries worked together to defeat
Christian II once he arrived in Norway in 1531.38 His treatment of Danish and Swedish
relations during the Count’s War is rather short. He argued that Denmark and Sweden
cooperated during this time because they had to defend themselves against Lübeck and
that Vasa and Christian III had a “reasonably harmonious” relationship.39 He also wrote
how Vasa, who had built an efficient navy, helped the Danes, along with the Prussians, to
defeat Lübeck’s naval fleet in 1535.40 Since Roberts’s main focus was the Reformation, it
is not surprising that he did not include a significant discussion of Vasa’s relationship
with Denmark at the time. From Roberts’s publication in the 1960s we turn the attention
to a more resent work by Michael Linton, who published a book on the history of Sweden
in 1994.41 This work is very different from Roberts’s book because it is a broad survey of
Sweden’s history from 1523 to modern times. As a sweeping survey of Swedish history
38

Ibid., 95-96.

39

Ibid., 99-100.

40

Ibid., 100.

41

Michael Linton, Sveriges Historie (Århus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 1994).
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this book covers a great variety of issues. It appears to be a sort of handbook of Swedish
history and each chapter stands alone, with no central theme binding it all together. The
author apparently wrote this book to meet the needs for a fresh look at the history of
Sweden through the ages, and focused strongly on modern history. In the first chapter,
which covers the period in question for this thesis, Linton dedicated a fair amount of
space discussing the Stockholm Bloodbath and Gustav Vasa’s rebellion against Christian
II. He wrote that Vasa strengthened his position of power by being deceitful and that he
was very suspicious and brutal, even towards old friends.42 Linton also portrays Vasa’s
relationship to Lübeck before and after his coronation. He wrote about various internal
rebellions that Vasa had to deal with, especially the uprising in 1532, where Gustav
executed its instigators. In connection to the Count’s War and Sweden’s relationship with
Sweden, Linton managed to cover it all in five sentences. He wrote that Vasa joined
Denmark against Lübeck, which resulted in an improvement in the relationship between
the two countries.43 Linton’s book, although it brushes over many details in the sixteenth
century, made a useful contribution regarding the person of Gustav Vasa, somewhat in
contrast to the assessments of Michale Roberts.
Like Linton, Lars-Olof Larssons’s book on the history of Sweden during the reign
of Gustav Vasa provided a different perspective then Roberts.44 Since Larsson’s focus
was solely on the Vasa period, he could provide far more detail than Linton. Larsson’s
purpose for writing this book was to offer a more critical view of Gustav Vasa in
42

Ibid., 17.

43

Ibid., 20.

44

Lars-Olof Larsson, Gustav Vasa: Landsfader eller Tyrann? (Stockholm: Prisma, 2002).
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comparison to what traditional historians had done. His overall argument was that
although Vasa helped to build the Swedish nation, he was also a usurper.45 Larsson’s
book portrayed in detail Vasa’s path to the Swedish throne and how he had to summon
the aid of Lübeck in order to succeed in his endovors. He suggested that Vasa attempted
to create a union with Lübeck to assist his cause, but that the town turned this proposal
down.46 Larsson argued that once Vasa had become king of Sweden in 1523, he practiced
political principles similar to those found in Machiavelli’s The Prince.47 One example
that Larsson used was how Vasa brutally handled the rebellion of 1542. About Swedish
and Danish relations, Larsson explained how the death of Frederik I made the political
situation in Denmark rather complicated and that civil war and aggression from Lübeck
followed. Larsson argued that since Gustav and Christian III were brothers-in-law, it
became obvious that he helped Denmark militarily at the time.48 He failed to include any
other information or detail about Sweden’s relationship with Denmark during the Count’s
War. Larsson’s book, however, served as a new and fresh look at the history of Sweden
in the days of Gustav Vasa.
The scholarly coverage of Scandinavian relations following the fall of the Kalmar
Union could be more focused. The amount of primary documents available for this period
allows a more detailed account of the topic. Although the arguments and conclusions of
this thesis might be similar to those of other scholars of the field, it will add a richer and
45

Ibid., 362.

46

Ibid., 71.

47

Ibid., 82.

48

Ibid., 201.
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more in-depth look at how the Scandinavian kingdoms coexisted in the years following
the end of the union. The majority of this thesis will deal with the relationship between
Denmark and Norway under Frederik I and until the end of the Count’s War, when
Christian III became the new king of the union. Issues between Denmark and Sweden
will focus mainly on their cooperation and relationship surrounding the Count’s War. The
process of the Reformation in Scandinavia will also be covered.
Sources
There are a vast amount of Scandinavian documents available from the Middle
Ages and the Early Modern period. Thankfully, a great number of primary sources from
the sixteenth century help to shed light on a variety of subjects of the time. One of the
most significant collections of documents is found in Diplomatarium Norwegicum, the
flagship of Norwegian sources. This collection originated at the National Archive in
Oslo, Norway, and consists of twenty-two volumes, containing roughly about 19,000
documents and letters, spanning from 1197 to the late sixteenth century. Although the
majority of the documents are Norwegian, this collection also contains a large number of
documents from Denmark and Sweden. Thanks to a document project at the University of
Oslo, these documents are available on-line. This collection has been essential to this
thesis as it has provided sources that deal with issues regarding Danish involvement in
Norway and Norwegian interaction with Danish nobles. Many of the letters used in this
thesis were written by Fredrik I, various Danish nobles, the Norwegian council, and some
by members of the Norwegian public. These letters have made it possible to create a
clearer and more detailed picture of Frederik I’s dealings with Norway, including how he
violated the Norwegian charter by placing Danes in possession of the fortresses.
24

Diplomatarium Norwegicum also provides insight into dealings that Danish nobles had in
Norway along with some examples of Norwegian response. Letters by Norwegians such
as Olaf Engelbrektsson shed light on issues in Norway and his attempts to dampen
Danish influence.
Another important collection of sources are found in a work edited by PaludanMüller.49 This two-volume work contains hundreds of letters from a great variety of key
players in the Count’s War and surrounding events. Most useful to this thesis are the
many letters by Gustav Vasa, Christian III, and the Danish council which help portray the
nature of Danish and Swedish relations after the fall of the Kalmar Union, including their
mutual assistance against Lübeck during the Count’s War. Through analysis of these and
other sources, this thesis will present a detailed account of Scandinavia relations after the
fall of the Kalmar Union. The aim has been to portray events as detailed as the sources
allow, in order to gain a better understanding of how this region in Northern Europe dealt
with significant change in the beginning phase of the Early Modern period. This area of
study is also important because it gives examples of how kings and nobles asserted their
power in order to maintain and even expand their level of influence. Another significant
contribution of this period was how Sweden and Denmark continued to maintain
diplomatic relationship after 1523 and strengthened their friendship through their
cooperation during the Count’s War.
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Chapter I: Cultural, Religious, and Lingual variation in DenmarkNorway and Danish noble influence in Norway before 1523.
Ever since Denmark and Norway first united under a common monarch in
1380, Denmark acted as the dominating partner in the relationship. This is perhaps
unsurprising based on the fact that Norway only had about 200,000 inhabitants at the
time and Denmark had about three times as many. Denmark also had a stronger
economy than Norway.50 The geography of Scandinavia also dictated that any
monarch in control of this region, with the center in Denmark, had to rely on others
to help rule such a vast area. Scandinavian geography was considerable different in
the 1520-30s than today. Danish-Norwegian boundaries extended significantly
farther into present-day Sweden, and included areas such as Bohuslän, Jämtland,
Härjedalen, Bornholm, and Skåne. Sweden, on the other hand, included most of
today’s Finland.
Another important issue was the relatively low number of nobles in Norway
by the sixteenth century. The Black Death, which arrived in Norway in 1349,
ravaged the country, possibly killing as much as fifty percent of the population. This,
along with subsequent outbreaks of plague in 1359-60, 1370, 1391, 1450s and 1500,
severely reduced Norway’s nobility. Although the plague killed many people in
Denmark and Sweden, the population rebounded faster there then in Norway because
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of different settlement structures.51 The result was a more numerous and stronger
nobility in Denmark and Sweden in comparison with Norway.
It appears that Norwegians made distinctions between themselves and the
Danes in the sixteenth century and perhaps even earlier. Although there are many
reasons for this, it is likely the Danish behavior in Norway might have assisted in
widening the gap between them. This comes from the fact that the most prominent
Danes in Norway between 1523 and 1536, Hans Mule, Vincent Lunge, Esge Bille,
and Henrik Krummedige, who all used their positions to further their own interests,
occasionally, angered Norwegians, who in turn viewed them as outsiders.
Scandinavia had had a long tradition of chieftains, overlords, and kings as local
rulers. Although there must have been certain inauguration rituals, little is known about
them prior to the twelfth century. The first Scandinavian coronation occurred around
1163.52 Denmark and Norway became united from the time leading up to the Kalmar
Union in the late fourteenth century and remained unified until the end of the Napoleonic
Wars in 1814. The driving force behind the Kalmar Union, which also included Sweden
until 1523, was Queen Margrete, who became the ruler in 1387. She managed to place
her relative, Erik of Pomerania, on the throne the following year.53 The Kalmar Union,
however, was established at a meeting at Kalmar, Sweden, in 1397, and out of a total of
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sixty-seven representatives from the three countries, only twelve were Norwegians.54 As
a composite state, meaning that more than one country was under the sovereignty of one
ruler, the Kalmar Union was not unique in early modern Europe. The Kalmar Union
shared similar traits with the Spanish Habsburg monarchy and that of England and
Ireland because the states in the union were separated from each other either by land or
sea.55
Several reasons explain why the Kalmar Union came to be. It has been suggested
that it came about partly to deal with the increasing economic influence of the Hanseatic
League and political domination of Germans.56 This issue served as a valid concern at the
time and was heavily reinforced in the first half of the sixteenth century, due to
aggressive behavior on behalf of Lübeck, the German center of the Hans. Under the
leadership of Jürgen Wullenwever, Lübeck took advantage of the succession crisis that
followed the death of Frederik I, and instigated the Count’s War in 1534, which had
significant impact on the region after its end in 1536. Another possible reason for the
Kalmar Union might have come from the need to end wars and conflicts within the
Nordic kingdoms.57 A financial crisis in Scandinavia may also be a possible reason for
the establishment of the union.58 The Kalmar Union managed to establish peace in
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Scandinavia for some time, but ended in 1523 after a successful Swedish attempt to break
away. Sweden’s rebellion against the union arose primarily because of the tyranic rule of
Christian II. This illustrates another common trait of composite states; the struggle to
survive.59 Despite Scandinavia’s similarities in religion, language and customs, which is
believed to have made it easier for unions to survive, the Kalmar Union proved that such
similarities sometimes failed to secure success. However, it is significant to point out that
although Sweden withdrew from the union under the leadership of Gustav Vasa, it
maintained a close diplomatic relationship with Denmark-Norway during the Count’s
War which helped to establish peace within Scandinavia until 1563.
While in power, Margrete established an extensive centralized system of royal
control within the union, and fulfilled her political aim to weaken the councils, which
particularly affected the role and authority of the Norwegian Council.60 During the
Kalmar Union the separate national councils consisted of the most prominent members of
society, including the clergy. The number of council members in Norway fluctuated
between twenty and forty individuals and in Denmark between thirty and forty.61 The
Norwegian council, however, failed to play an important political role until 1437, only to
completely lose its authority after Christian III ascended the throne in 1536.62
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Norwegian versus Danish
Scandinavians had shared a common culture, religion, and language since
the day of the Vikings. One reason for this was the fact that the Vikings were
situated in the scarcely populated area farthest north in Europe. Since their territories
were surrounded by water, they maintained a link by seaborne traffic, the ship
serving as a significant factor in this.63 Because of this heritage of a shared culture
and also due to later political unions, Denmark and Norway still shared similarities
in many respects in the first half of the sixteenth century. Such similarities also
included Sweden, but since it had very few direct dealings with Norway during the
1520-30s, the focus here will be on Denmark and Norway.
Although it is impossible to use the modern term ‘nationalism’ for this
period, it has been suggested that people in Scandinavia did have a sense of ‘national
identity’.64 Other Europeans also identified with their own countries during the
sixteenth century. England and Castile are good examples of this as their distinctive
identities were significantly sharpened due to religious upheavals, which resulted in
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an aggressive sense of their place in God’s design.65 Religion was also an issue that
affected Scandinavia at the time.
A religions divide existed between Denmark and Norway in the early sixteenth
century, which helped to widen the gap between Danes and Norwegians. Even though
Norway had had little exposure to Lutheranism by 1536, Denmark began the process of
reform under Christian II, who invited reformers to come to Denmark and make
recommendations for changes within the church.66 When Frederik I emerged as king of
Denmark-Norway in 1523, he promised in his Coronation Charter that:
We shall never permit any heretic Lutheran disciples or others to preach or teach, in
secret or in public, against the heavenly God, the faith of the holy church, or the Holy
Father, the pope, and the Church of Rome. And wherever such are found in our
kingdom…they should be punished by forfeiting life and property.67

Despite the fact that the charter clearly stated that Lutheran or any other teachings
challenging the pope and the Catholic Church would be banned, even punishable by
death, Frederik personally made several changes which actually severed the Danish
Church from Rome. He allowed his son, Duke Christian, to marry a Lutheran princess
and, in 1525, dissolved the Catholic Church in Schleswig-Holstein and introduced
Lutheran services.68 In 1526, Frederik also let Christian establish the first Lutheran
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school of theology in the Nordic countries.69 Frederik further decreed that the most
significant officers in the Church no longer needed papal confirmation and the fee new
bishops traditionally had paid, to the pope now went to the king instead.70
In 1527 at the Diet of Odense, it was decided that Danes should enjoy “freedom
of conscience. No one shall be at liberty to ask whether a man is Lutheran or
Catholic….The king extends his protection to the Lutherans, who hitherto have not
enjoyed such full security and safe-conduct as the Catholics.”71 Frederik went on to
directly violate the charter, by providing a letter of protection to Hans Tausen, the most
significant Lutheran preacher in Denmark at the time.72
Not all members of the Danish Council, many of them Catholic bishops,
supported the Reformationists and the civil war which ensued after Frederik I’s death
clearly showed forth divisions among the nobles. The lay population also got involved in
the religious issue. This can be explained by the great number of commoners who greeted
Count Christoffer with enthusiasm when he arrived in May 1534.73 The Count’s War
provided Christian III with a way to make his claim to the throne, and in all reality,
signified the last nail in the coffin for the Catholic Church in Denmark and also in
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Norway. Christian was a very religious person who firmly believed in Luther’s gospel,
and he has often been referred to as the ‘priest king’.74 When the Count’s War ended in
1536, he proceeded to make the official church in Denmark Lutheran. He arrested many
of the bishops, dissolved monasteries, and confiscated Church lands.75 Some bishops,
however, went over to Lutheranism and remained at their posts.76 The new Lutheran
Church Ordinance was sent to Martin Luther in Wittenberg, who in turn informed
Christian, in December 1536 that he approved of the changes made to the Danish
Church.77 In 1537, Christian called in help from Wittenberg to complete the reform, and
the new Danish Church became a pure State Church controlled by the monarchy.78
By 1536-37, most Norwegians were still Catholics.79 Strong opposition to the
Reformation existed among Norwegian ecclesiastical leaders. Engelbrektsson serves as
an example of resistance towards Lutheran teachings in Norway. Bishop Hoskold of
Stavanger asked Esge Bille to keep the “damned and infidel Lutheran” teachings out of
the area.80 Christian III began making changes in the Norwegian church in 1537 and after
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several years both Denmark and Norway had fully embraced the Reformation, again
united under the same religion.
Another significant identifier for Scandinavians was language which had been an
element of common ground for centuries. Northern Germany and southern Scandinavia
served as the cradle of Germanic, a language that was a distinct branch of Indo-European.
Around AD 550-750, or the so-called ‘syncope period,’ Scandinavian language began to
develop its own form of speech.81 Although it is hard to determine a specific time when
Danish and Norwegian (including Swedish) diverged, evidence suggests that regional
differences in pronunciation and vocabulary existed already in the High Middle Ages.82
In fact, it is believed that the linguistic unity of the North began to break up around year
800. It is possible that this change occurred due to vigorous Scandinavian contact with
surrounding neighbors and the deviations which gradually separated east Scandinavia,
which consisted of Denmark, southern Sweden and certain areas of Norway, from west
Scandinavia which would have been most of Norway.83
The relatively few literate individuals in the early sixteenth century, nobles
and members of the clergy, shared Danish or Latin as the written language. There
existed, despite the fact that the official written language in Norway was Danish, a
major difference between spoken Danish and Norwegian.84 Although Denmark had a
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variety of Danish dialects, it failed to come close to the variation that existed (and
still does) in Norway. Because of Norway’s geography, many settlements were
rather isolated and had little contact with the surrounding world. Distinct dialects
developed, perhaps especially so on the west coast, that had little resemblance to
spoken Danish. Variation of dialects in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, does not
mean that people lacked ability to understand or communicate effectively amongst
their own countrymen and even within the three countries. Although language
differences existed it is believed that the extent to which this mattered rested partly
with the ear of the listener. It is estimated that during the French Revolution about
three million people in France could not speak French, and issue that some
revolutionaries believed created disunity, and wanted to create a uniform language.
However, resent studies suggests that no major language barrier existed in France
because of this and the revolutionaries had invented the ‘problem’ of disunity from
lingual diversity.85
It has also been argued that the diversity of languages in pre-print Europe
constituted the “warp and woof” of the lives of the speakers.86 This notion seems to
fit nicely in the Scandinavian setting, perhaps even after the emergence of printing,
and might help to explain how language, for at least a significant number of people,
helped to distinguish Norwegians from their Danish neighbors. Distinct cultures also
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emerged as a result of isolation and dialect diversity and people often identified with
their local language and customs.87
Customs and culture distinguished Norwegians from the Danes, and also the
Swedes. The difference in geography helped to create this difference. Norway’s
rugged terrain, with its large mountains and fjords, harsh climate and meager
harvests stood in stark contrast to Denmark’s more temperate climate, idyllic setting
and rich grain harvests.88 Just as Norwegians viewed themselves as a separate
people, the same was most likely true for the Danes. It has been suggested that the
rough climate made Norwegians somewhat more spirited and aggressive than the
Danes.89 In a letter addressed to the Archbishop of Trondheim in 1525, a Danish
nobleman stated that Norwegians “are rather poorly liked in Denmark”.90 This
strengthens the notion that despite their political union, Norwegians and Danes did
not necessarily share other common identifiers. In fact, Danes knew for sure that
they were not Swedes, and vice versa, at the time when the Seven Years war broke
out in 1564, when Danes and Swedes condemned each other and glorified
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themselves.91 It has also been argued that in the long run, cultural systems preceded
the growth of nationalism.92
The Old Norwegian laws, which had bound Norwegians together since the
eleventh century, also helped to create a sense of identity among Norwegians.93 The
Norwegian council reminded Esge Bille, a Danish nobleman who took control of the
fortress in Bergen in 1529, that by summoning citizens of Oslo to Bergen, he
violated “Norway’s law and the old freedoms and privileges…and good old
habits…of the land.”94 The Norwegian laws had been preserved and represented
something that was tied to Norway’s history. Through the times of political
domination from Denmark, this law strengthened the Norwegian consciousness and
copies of the law, or at least fragments of it, existed all over the country.95
Although Christian III significantly reduced Norway’s political influence in
1536, he still had to abide by the Norwegian law. In 1547, Christian III announced
that he intended to be crowned by the citizens of Norway “according to Norway’s
old customs…and assure law and order to every man according to Norway’s law.”96
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Christian’s advisors, including Esge Bille, had informed him previously that he had
to treat the Norwegians respectfully and consider Norwegian social conditions.97
Christian, however, never made it to the ceremony of homage but sent his son,
Frederik II, in his place. The fact that Christian had separated his crowning in
Denmark with the one in Norway, helped inhabitants in Norway to realize, whether
they lived in Trondheim or Stavanger, that they were not Danish.98 Other elements
also strengthened this notion. One important factor came through Danish exertion of
power and influence in Norway, often displayed by Danish nobles positioned in high
places, which occasionally angered Norway’s population.
Danish Behavior in Norway
Although Denmark and Norway were officially united since before the Kalmar
Union, some Norwegians challenged the power of the Denmark’s royalty and nobility.
Norwegian nobleman Amund Sigurdsson, along with farmers and members of the lower
nobility, led an unsuccessful rebellion against Danish rule in 1436 due to the pressure of
taxes. Despite official peace in Norway following this rebellion, many people were still
dissatisfied with the level of Danish control.99 Another rebellion, under the leadership of
Knut Alvsson broke out in 1501 and had connections to rebels in Sweden as well.100 King
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John (Hans) expressed his great surprise to the Norwegian council that they had let
Alvsson and his people “so enter into Norway, robbing…and killing our subjects….We
believe it be in the best interest that…your people…pursue…Knud’s servants and break
down his farms that he and they should not have shelter there.”101 After the plea from
John, his loyal men in Norway brought the rebellion to its knees and had Alvsson killed
in 1502.102 Little is known about Alvsson, and the background for this rebellion remains
uncertain. It is believed, however, that Alvsson rebelled because of a feud with Danish
nobleman Henrik Krummedige over issues of land in Norway.103 This effort to break free
appears to have been the most serious attempt, at least from a Danish point of view.104
During the reign of Christian II, who replaced his father, John, in 1513, sources reveal no
major rebellions in Norway. Some farmers, however, complained about the heavy tax
burdens he levied on Norwegians.105 Christian II faced significantly more challenges
from Sweden in the 1520s, as the Kalmar Union crumbled. As Sweden broke free in
1523, Norway remained under the rule of Denmark.
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Prior to being placed in the position as Bishop of Oslo by Frederik I, Danish
nobleman Hans Mule had control of Akershus Fortress in Oslo. During the reign of
Christian II, he had also acted as a strong supporter of the king. After Christian II’s
abdication in 1523, however, he became one of Frederik’s men in Norway.106 In a letter
to Frederik I, Mule wrote that he had withdrawn his support of Christian II and supported
the “honest and Christian revolt which Denmark’s national council and many of its
inhabitants have waged against King Christian”107 What made him change his position in
regards to Christian II remains uncertain. Evidence suggests, however, that he did it out
of necessity in order to maintain control of Akershus Fortress. He promised Frederik that
he would, on his honor, keep the fortress loyal to Frederik if he maintained possession of
it.108 In Fact, Mule went to great lengths to possess the fortress and suppressed any
opposition to his own position as head of Akershus. In 1523, he pillaged and burned the
farm of one of his Norwegian rivals, Olaf Galle, who came from the last Norwegian
family belonging to the higher nobility.109 Farmers in the area reported that:
Master Hans Mule sent his people up here to Hedmark and burned the farm of Olaf
Galle…and beat his people to death and he has since sent his people again to Hedmark
and burned…and violated both priests and farmers and have beaten farmers to death
and have at the same time done more evil here. 110
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There are few examples of Danish nobles committing such acts in Norway during the
first half of the sixteenth century, especially by individuals who would later serve in
the position as Bishop of Oslo. Although this event serves as a rather extreme
example of Danish influence, it shows that some Danes went to great lengths to
protect the positions they had in Norwegian politics and affairs.
The farmers who reported this incident wrote in hopes of receiving help in
their predicament. Their letter is devoid of any particular attitude towards Mule for
his actions. Although the sources are silent on this matter, this fails to rule out that
such atrocities would have caused resentment on the behalf of the local population.
No evidence suggests that Mule ever had to account for his behavior. Did Frederik
know about this when he decided to make him Bishop of Oslo and would it have had
an impact on his decision? Unfortunately, sources fail to reveal the answer to these
questions. The fact is that Mule maintained an influential position in Norway after
these events. Little is known about Mule’s actions following his attack in Hedmark,
as he drowned in a shipwreck in 1524, the same year Olaf Engelbrektsson had
anointed him Bishop of Oslo.111
Like Hans Mule, it appears that Esge Bille also used violent methods when
necessary. Esge Bille, a Danish nobleman, came to Norway in 1528 and took charge
of Bergenshus fortress in 1529. His father-in-law, Mogens Gyldenstjerne, controlled
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Akershus Fortress in Oslo. Apparently a man called Stig Bagge murdered a public
officer named Benkt in Mandal, Norway on Bille’s orders. The Norwegian council
offered the following statement:
[We] inquired of…Esge Bille, if he…would confess giving the order of this hostile act
to Stig Bagge…towards officer Benkt in Mandal whom he beat to death. Then…Esge
Bille…said that all that he had done in connection with the hostile act, including
…officer Benkt in Mandal and all else, should be his own acts and not those of…Stig
Bagge.112

Following the testimony of Bille, Stig Bagge was cleared of all charges in this
matter.113 It is unknown if Bille faced any repercussions because of this, but it is
unlikely. The Danish council, however, encouraged Bille to offer some kind of
compensation to Bagge.114 No sources shed light on the background of this or any
possible motive for Bille’s decision to murder the officer in question. No other case
like this exists during to Bille’s time in Norway. Although the sources are silent on
the matter, it is likely that such incidents helped alienate Danes from the
Norwegians. This case also shows that prominent Danes occasionally used violence
as a means to achieve their goals.
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This case appears to be an exception for Esge Bille. Sources offer no
indication that he made it a habit to have people murdered. However, there are
examples of how people under his command reverted to violent means. In one
instance the Norwegian council wrote and questioned Bille for violating Norwegian
law in connection with a complaint filed by a citizen of Oslo:
Today, here at court in Oslo, came one of the city’s citizens, Mikkel Jute, before us with
a complaint that your people had treated him roughly and taken his possessions…it
appears strange to us that you would take upon you such…which you well know is
against Norway’s law…and against the command you have from the king…to grant the
average man law and order….It appears right to us to let Mikkel Jute have his money
and possessions back which were taken from him….It is not right that anyone here

in the kingdom should be attacked in such a manner.115

Little is known about the specifics of this incident, including anything else about
Mikkel Jute or those who had offended him. The matter obviously rested with Bille
and his people as being responsible. Did Mikkel Jute tell the truth or would he have
had any reason to fabricate such a story? It is difficult to know for sure. If Jute told
the truth, however, it is evidence of the fact that violence occurred under the
leadership of certain Danish nobles in Norway at the time. Even though the sources
failed to explain Mikkel Jute’s attitude or anyone else’s take on this issue, it is again
likely that episodes like this would have created resentment towards Danish nobles
in Norway. One way it could have mattered is if rumors of such incidents spread.
Both these instances involving Esge Bille also show that the Norwegian council
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stepped in and tried to rectify the damages done, which in turn shows that the council
actively got involved in internal matters. Whether the council’s involvement
compelled Bille to respond is uncertain. Apart from these incidents, it seems that
Bille spent most of his time in more peaceful pursuits.
Vincent Lunge heavily involved himself in Norwegian affairs. Lunge arrived
in Norway in 1524 on Frederik I’s request. He was a highly educated nobleman and
former principle of Copenhagen’s university. He made his way into Norwegian
politics mainly because of his marriage to the daughter of one of Norway’s richest
men, Niels Henriksson.116 In addition to having been in control of Bergenshus,
Frederik I also granted Lunge possession of Årstad Church in Bergen, with its farm
and mill, along with Nonneseter convent.117 This convent later functioned as Lunge’s
estate under the name of Lungegård. Lunge actually involved himself in selling, on
behalf of Frederik I, land and estates in Norway.118 Lunge also increased his land
holdings in Norway. In 1525, Erik Johansson officially declared that he had sold
“from me and my heirs [to]…Vincent Lunge, my dear friend and his heirs my farm
Moland and its estates.”119 This purchase also included extensive fishing and hunting
rights.120 Johansson’s heirs, however, expressed deep dissatisfaction with the
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transaction.121 Although he lost control of Bergenshus to Esge Bille in 1529, he still
gained additional property, and along with the resources acquired through his
marriage, most likely boosted his political position significantly.
As early as 1525, however, Lunge admitted to the Archbishop that there were
many people in Norway with unfriendly attitudes towards him.122Although he failed
to specify who or why he had enemies in Norway, there are other sources that show
how some Norwegians became upset because of his political involvement. Members
of the general public in Jemtland, an area that fell under Lunge’s jurisdiction in
Norway, uttered words of complaint in a letter to Frederik I in 1530. Their complaint
had to do with Lunge’s decision to sell a public forest containing a lake used by
those living in that area.123 It seems like it must have caused annoyance with the
locals as they repeated the same complaint six years later. In this instance they wrote
that Lunge’s action had caused “many poor men damage and deprivation and
forbidden any man to fish.”124 Even though the sale of this public forest and its lake
might seem trivial, it aggravated people there enough to write about it twice. Despite
the lack of strong examples, these kinds of issues do, at least, show that certain
Norwegians had issues with the actions of the Danish nobles of the time.
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Another issue that involved Lunge had to do with Henrik Krummedige, who
also arrived in Norway under the directions of Frederik I. Krummedige, a merchant
and nobleman of Schleswig-Holstein descent, already had extensive experience in
Norway, and loyally served king John in the early 1500s. His influence in Norway
was certainly felt in those days when Knut Alvsson rebelled as a result of his
involvement. Krummedige, a wealthy man, had in the early 1500s acquired a
significant amount of land in Denmark, including some in Skåne. Before Frederik I
sent him to Norway in the early 1520s, he already owned a large amount of land
there.125 It has been argued that Krummedige got involved in Norwegian politics
because of his economic interests. He apparently spent a great deal of time trying to
increase his wealth through his Norwegian estates, dealing heavily in live stock and
other agricultural goods.126
Shortly after Lunge and Krummedige arrived in Norway, Lunge instigated a
plot against his Danish companion, probably because he desired more land and
power for himself.127 Lunge managed to persuade the Norwegian council to deprive
Krummedige of his Norwegian properties and to banish him from the country. The
council used the excuse that Krummedige had misused his position and displayed
“unfair [and] unrighteous” behavior in Norway.128 Because of this decision,
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Krummedige spent the time between1524-29 outside of Norway, trying desperately
to regain what he had lost.129 The Danish Council asked that Norway’s council
would reconsider and return Krummedige’s property because it had unrightfully
been taken from him.130 Frederik also disapproved of this action by Lunge and
Norway’s council, and demanded that it be corrected. He informed Archbishop
Engelbrektsson that:
Henrik Krummedige…our man and council…have been hindered…and…the council
have taken his property which he has been in possession of…and which are rightfully in
his inheritance and ownership….Therefore we kindly ask that you would immediately
… again return to Henrik Krummedige or his proxy the same property.131

Frederik told Krummedige to be patient and wait until the matter could be
resolved.132 In 1529, through pressure from Frederik, Krummedige returned to
Norway and regained his lost property. He died the following year but his assets in
Norway remained in his family, in part through his relative Esge Bille.
Lunge’s actions stand as an example of what might be considered a form of
disloyalty. His campaign against another Danish nobleman in Norway was stopped
by Frederik, but Lunge most likely never faced any real repercussions because of
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this. In 1526, however, when Lunge supported a runaway Swedish rebel called
daljunkeren, he made a political error indeed.133 This did not please Gustav Vasa
much, but he did forgive Lunge for his misjudgment. Lunge wrote to Vasa and
thanked him for not holding his actions against him.134 It is likely, however, that this
action cost Lunge his possession of Bergenshus. Still Lunge remained in a strong
political position and if Frederik had seen Lunge’s actions as being truly disloyal, he
most likely would not have awarded him additional land and property in Norway in
1528.135 Amassing property and land, then, definitely served as a driving force for
some of the men that Frederik I sent to serve his needs in Norway.
How the general population in Norway reacted to the Danish eagerness to
obtain land and wealth is uncertain. It is highly probable that most Norwegians had
little or no knowledge of this as it most likely occurred within the circles of nobles
and other privileged citizens. The general public became more involved in matters
that directly affected them, like the case where Lunge deprived the inhabitants in
Jemtland of using their forest and lake. The issue of fees and taxes also caused the
public to protest. In one incident Norwegians complained about having to give tithes
to the church and taxes to the nobility because they feared “that we cannot give our
lord and king the tax which we have a duty to pay.”136 The local taxes mentioned
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here failed to reflect only on the Danish nobles but encompassed the Norwegian ones
as well. The people, however, obviously had concerns about their ability to meet all
the monetary requirements set by the Danish crown.
Perhaps the most extreme example of negative Norwegian attitudes towards
Danish involvement in Norway came out of Archbishop Engelbrektsson’s 1536
revolt in Trondheim, where two Danes, including Vincent Lunge, lost their lives.
Many inhabitants in Trondheim joined Engelbrektsson in his revolt. In written
documents these people wrote that they were against the decision the council had
made to elect Christian III as king without the consent of the people and that they
feared that Christian would forcefully levy a heavy tax on the Norwegian people.137
Included in their statement is how Vincent Lunge suffered death as a punishment for
his involvement and “treachery”.138 This clearly shows that Norwegians opposed the
involvement of Danes in Norwegian affairs. Vincent Lunge paid the ultimate price
for his involvement showing that Norwegians could and occasionally did act on their
resentment towards Danish influence. In relation to other cases, however, the revolt
in Trondheim stands as a rather unusual event of the period.139
With exception of the revolt in Trondheim, conditions in Norway were
relatively peaceful during the days of Frederik I, Christian III, and the Count’s War.
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Even though average Norwegians might have distinguished themselves from the
Danish, and occasionally raised their voices against actions of Danish nobles, they
managed to avoid major confrontations.
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Chapter II: Norwegian Decline under Frederik I and Christian III
Following Christian I’s ascension to the throne of Denmark- Norway in 1450, the
Danish and Norwegian national councils, the political tools of Norway and Denmark’s
aristocracy, drew up a procedural agreement for dealing with the issue of succession to
the throne of the two countries. The council decided that when the ruling monarch died
Shall the council in the kingdom where the king dies…invite the other council, so that
councils on both sides quickly assemble…and if the king has a legitimate son or many,
then shall both councils elect for a king whom they believe to be best qualified….in
cases of electing a king both kingdoms shall have free reins, free power, and free will
without any hindrance or contradiction…and they are not to part until they are in
agreement concerning a lord and king over both kingdoms.140

This statement illustrates how the national councils of Denmark and Norway attempted to
work together during the days of the Kalmar Union. In the same agreement the councils
also concluded that the two kingdoms should “hereafter remain under one lord and king
forever more.”141 The issue of succession played an important part in the relationship
between Denmark and Norway. The role and influence of the national councils also
served as a key ingredient in this relationship. The councils emerged in Scandinavia in
the thirteenth century and served many functions, including making laws, imposing taxes,
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enforcing justice, and perhaps most importantly, electing kings.142 Councils were also
used in other areas in Europe at the time, like in Spain, where a council of native
councilors provided a forum for locals to voice opinions and grievances.143 At the time of
the Kalmar Union, the councils initially intended to make the two kingdoms equal in their
relationships so that no kingdom should fall under the yoke of the other.144 In reality,
however, the more powerful of the two, Denmark, gradually asserted itself as the
dominating faction in the union. For instance, Christian I often treated issues involving
Norway without consulting or considering Norwegian interests.145 Christian II, who
reigned from 1513 to 1523, made energetic efforts to minimize the influence of the
privileged groups of Norwegian society, and managed to suppress the influence of the
council by deliberately avoiding replacing members as old ones died.146 Danish
domination became more pronounced under the rule of Frederik I and Christian III.
The period between 1523 and 1536 constitutes an important time for the Nordic
countries, as the Kalmar Union had failed and Scandinavia faced the challenges of
foreign aggression. Denmark-Norway struggled with a Danish succession crisis and also
with the question of religious reform under the influence of the Lutheran Reformation. In
order to comprehend the relationship between Denmark and Norway during this time it is
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necessary to examine the Danish royal policies and involvement in Norwegian affairs,
starting with Frederik I, the Danish-Norwegian king who preceded his nephew, Christian
II, in 1523. After Frederik I’s death in 1533, a three-year interregnum followed, which
lasted until the end of the Count’s War in 1536, when Christian III became king of
Denmark-Norway. Initially, the Danish-Norwegian union resembled a form of union
known as aeque principaliter, where the constituent kingdom was treated as a distinct
entity, preserving its own privileges and laws, the king obliged to maintain their status
and identity, allowing a rather high level of local self-government. Such form of union
was also found in Spain in the sixteenth century, where the Spanish Habsburgs
successfully managed to hold their large monarchy together through this system. In fact,
composite monarchies based on aeque principaliter could only last if the original rules of
the union were followed.147 As we will see, Fredrik I, by ignoring the promises in his
coronation charter, began the process of doing away with qualifiers for an aeque
principaliter union by reducing the influence of Norway and its council by placing
prominent Danes in high positions in Norway. After the succession crisis and the war that
followed, Christian III completed the process of removing the last remnants of Norway’s
influence in the union.
Norwegian Decline under Frederik I
Frederik I (reigned1523-1533) came to the Danish-Norwegian throne in the wake
of the tyranny of Christian II. The key to Frederik’s success came from the support and
aid of Lübeck which, in return, maintained its trading privileges in Denmark and an
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exemption from Sound dues.148 Because Lübeck had helped Frederik to the throne, they
also received other benefits. In an agreement between Frederik and Lübeck, the latter was
given control of the Island of Bornholm.149 Evidence also shows that Frederik paid an
annual fee to Lübeck.150 During his ten-year reign, Frederik barely left his home in
Schleswig-Holstein, most likely never learned to speak Danish, and never set foot on
Norwegian soil.151 Frederik’s time on the throne was plagued by internal struggles within
Denmark. One major concern for the new monarch was the constant threat of a possible
return of the ousted Christian II. Christian had gone into exile in the Netherlands where
he was welcome due to his marriage to Elisabeth, sister of Charles V.152 Another
important factor which Frederik dealt with had to do with the Danish union with Norway
and the need to maintain control of the Norwegians.153 In this period, including during the
Count’s War and its aftermath, Norway became overrun by Danish noblemen who
asserted their influence in the kingdom. Danish royal and councilor influence resulted in
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an uneven balance of power which favored Denmark and reduced the Norwegian
council’s ability and opportunity to address Norwegian issues.
In order to win the favor of Norway’s council, Frederik wrote several letters to
Norwegian clergy seeking support for his cause. On 20 July 1523, Bishop Magnus of
Hamar, Norway, wrote the bishop of Roskilde that he had received, in a rather mysterious
way, a letter from Frederik, who encouraged the bishop to accept him as King of Norway.
Magnus informed his Danish colleague that the letter reached him through a farm boy
and a local priest, and admitted that the council could not meet together in order to offer
Frederik a final response. He also added an important piece of information when he
wrote:
In His Grace’s letter, which arrived here, Duke Frederik writes that he is the rightful
heir to the kingdom of Norway, in which you and more good lords should know that
our Norwegian team, and all kings’… privileges here in Norway contradicts…his own
father, king Christian…who had no rights until he became crowned in the
kingdom….Norway is and has been…a kingdom free to elect a king as well as
154
Denmark and Sweden, which His Grace most likely knows.

This passage offers a unique sense of how some Norwegians felt a need to protect their
right to have a voice in the question of a possible successor to the throne. It appears
Frederik took it for granted that the Norwegians would ultimately approve of his position
as next king.
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In another letter, addressed to people like Archbishop Olaf Engelbrektsson of
Trondheim and Bishop Hoskold Hoskuldsson in Stavanger, Frederik admonished them to
join him and
crown us as your lord and king and teach your subjects what damage, spiritually and
temporarily, would come when the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway are separated
from the union which binds them together.155

In the same letter he promised these churchmen that if they gave him support he would
let them keep their positions in the future.156 Overall these letters indicate that the
Norwegian council possessed some level of influence at this time since Frederik actually
had to appeal to its members to promote his candidacy. It appears that the agreement of
1450, namely that one country should not dominate the other, still had some resonance
before Frederik managed to claim the Danish-Norwegian throne.
In addition to sending letters of appeal, Frederik also dealt with the issue of
Norway by sending two trusted member of the Danish national council, Henrik
Krummedige and Vincent Lunge, to represent the Danish royalty and to ensure that the
Norwegians would support him as the new king of the union. Krummedige reported back
to Frederik in September 1523 that he had convinced the inhabitants in Marstrand,
Norway, to be loyal to Frederik as long as the old Norwegian laws would be upheld.157
The farmers of Hedmark, Norway, likewise pledged their support:
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We, common farmers…who build and live in Hedmark greet you Henrik
Krummedige…must you know…Henrik that the good…bishop Moen of
Hammer(Hamar) read and made known to us the letter from the mighty…duke and lord
Frederik, how the good and worthy lords of Denmark’s national council and common
Danish inhabitants have agreed to take his grace as lord and king of Denmark…we will
submit ourselves under Duke Frederik as the inhabitants of Denmark’s kingdom want
His Grace as lord and King…we then give the answer that we would much like to be
subjected to His Grace and approve him at the same time as our Lord and King.158

These farmers reveal that ordinary inhabitants in Norway, at least to some degree,
involved themselves in questions of succession. Another issue revealed in this letter is
that these Norwegians appear to have looked to the Danes and followed their example.
This letter also shows that Frederik believed in a strategy that involved obtaining
the favor of the average population and not just members of the national council. A letter
from Vincent Lunge, Frederik’s other messenger in Norway, strengthens this notion.
Lunge reported to Frederik that he had accomplished his mission, and traveled from
Lindesnes to Vardø, preaching the content of letters from Frederik to the people.159
According to Lunge’s report, all Norwegians in his path had given promises of obedience
to Frederik as the new king.160 For all intents and purposes it seemed that Frederik’s
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strategies paid off. The Norwegian council, however, initially postponed its decision to
accept Frederik as King of Norway in order to secure control of the fortresses and to
ensure that Norway would still have a voice in proclaiming the monarchs. The
Norwegian council declared Frederik King of Norway in August 1524, when the entire
council met together for the first time in ten years.161 The next step for Frederik was to
pen a Norwegian charter.
The charter Frederik made for Norway in 1524 had the unique character of being
separate from the Danish.162 In essence this charter established guidelines for the balance
of power between the king and the Norwegian council. In this charter, Frederik referred
to himself as the “rightful heir to Norway from this day.”163 He also established that trade
ports in Norway, Bergen serving as the most significant one, should indeed maintain
trading privileges they had enjoyed previously, and that the king should never “distribute
to any foreign man any of the kingdom’s castles…and if this needs to be done for the
kingdom’s sake then it will be done after the consent of Norway’s council.”164 Frederik
had, in fact, about a year previously, already established himself as the rightful heir to
and nobles…and to me on your behalf have given promises of loyalty,” : “Jeg nw tess gwdt…haffuer myn
befalling fuldgjort i swo made at ieg haffue lath lese oc fførkynne…aff ethers nades breff i alle the
land…some ligge norden ffore Lindenes oc indtill Wordehus ffor menige almwge edle oc wedle
gysthelige…oc meg pa ethers nades wegne loffuet oc tilsagt hwuldskaff.”
161
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Norway and promised to maintain the old freedoms which Norway had enjoyed,
including the right to trade with “Denmark and also Lübeck, Hamburg…and other places
where your business might take you, unhindered by us and all others on our behalf.”165
The charter also stated that the king should “never add any property tax on the common
man or trade ports without the advice or consent of the council.”166 In his charter,
Frederik also granted the Norwegian council the right to freely elect archbishops, bishops
and other church officials.167
Although these few items represent only a small portion of the charter, it clearly
indicates that the king would run Norway along with the council, or at least that the king
needed to get the council’s approval before making certain economic and political
decisions relating to the Norwegian kingdom. In theory, then, the Norwegian council was
to have had a fair amount of control over domestic issues along with the power to control
the country’s few strategic castles. Despite the fact that the charter limited the king’s
power and called for the active involvement of the Norwegian council, the king ignored
these rules as time passed.
Frederik’s Norwegian charter stated the Norwegian castles or fortresses should
remain in the hands of Norwegians. In November 1524, however, just after the charter
came into existence, Frederik gave Vincent Lunge control of Bergenshus fortress in
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Bergen.168 The decision to give this fortress to Lunge appears to have been in process for
some time and apparently had the support of Norwegian clergymen on the west coast.
The bishops of Stavanger and Bergen wrote:
We know of no one else who can better protect the common people from wrong and
violence than the honorable…man and knight Vincent Lunge, who received the
daughter of another honorable…man and knight Niels Henriksson, since he will make a
good and faithful Norwegian man.169

These bishops obviously believed that Lunge had the qualities needed to manage the
fortress at Bergen and to provide the necessary protection for the people there. Although
Lunge was a Dane his marriage into a Norwegian family legally made him a Norwegian.
Technically, then, Lunge became a clear example of a Danish nobleman who firmly
established himself within Norway in this period. Within a short time Lunge became a
leader of Norwegian politics.170 In 1529, however, Lunge had to pass his possession of
Bergenshus on to another Dane by the name of Esge Bille (Bilde), who also came to have
some influence on Norwegian politics.171 In addition, Frederik sent Mogens
Gyldenstjerne to Norway who in turn took over the administration of Akershus Fortress
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in Oslo.172 Frederik placed another Dane, Claus Bille, in charge of Båhus Fortress, and he
remained there until 1555.173 Due to the nature of the sources available, the discussion
will focus on the fortresses in Bergen and Oslo.
Having Danish men in charge of the Norwegian fortresses offered Frederik an
effective means of maintaining control of Norway, with the proviso that they remained
loyal to him. These men spent much of their time taking care of royal business and trying
to keep important people loyal to the king. They ensured that Norwegians paid their taxes
and that Norway gave the promised support to the king. Frederik wrote in a letter that
Vincent Lunge had “given account for how he has obtained the help promised
by…Norway’s national council…and how he, on our behalf, has obtained…land
taxes.”174 In one instance, Mogens Gyldenstjerne reported Norwegian unwillingness to
pay certain fees.175 When Esge Bille came to Bergen he demanded that the bailiffs of
Helgeland, northern Norway, pay him their fees for the previous year.176 Frederik also
commanded his key players in Norway to negotiate internal feuds and struggles. Before
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he left for Norway, Esge Bille received instructions to serve as mediator in a struggle
over property involving the widow of Niels Henriksson.177 People like Esge Bille also
ensured the support of local clergy. In May 1529, he wrote to Bishop Hoskold of
Stavanger and pleaded with him that he stand by Bille in word and action. Along with
this letter, possibly to ensure cooperation, he sent the bishop a barrel of mead.178
Because of his Danish men in Norway, Frederik could more easily maintain
control of activities there. It also increased his ability to ensure protection against foreign
threats, especially a possible invasion by Christian II. After Esge Bille took control of
Bergenshus he reported to Frederik regarding shipments of armaments, gun powder and
other supplies needed at the fortress.179 At one time, Frederik also sent soldiers of some
type, to strengthen Bergenshus.180 Both Esge Bille and Mogens Gyldenstierne, who
controlled Akershus Fortress in Oslo, received instructions from Frederik in 1530 that
they should remain in their respective fortresses due to a possible attack from Christian
II.181 Frederik, however, made sure that these fortresses also brought something in return
besides desired control and protection in Norway. Each noble who controlled a fortress
had to pay an annual fee to the king. While Esge Bille controlled Bergenshus, he also sent
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timber and fish to Denmark.182 This practice would most likely have remained the same,
regardless of who controlled the fortresses, but Frederik could remain more at ease
knowing that he had loyal Danes placed at strategic positions in Norway. Because of this,
Danes managed to tighten the noose, as they had gained control of vital positions of
power within Norway.
Frederik I and the Danish council eagerly supported the efforts of Danes in
Norwegian politics. Members of clergy, especially the bishops, had a profound influence
in political matters. A question of importance had to do with the Bishopric of Oslo. In a
feud between Bishop Anders Mus and Danish nobleman Hans Mule, Frederik stepped in
and, not surprisingly, decided that the Danish Hans Mule should serve as Bishop
instead.183 In a letter to Archbishop Olaf Engelbrektsson in Trondheim, Frederik wrote
that he, along with the Danish council, had reached an agreement between the two and
strongly encouraged the archbishop to personally confirm and anoint Hans Mule Bishop
of Oslo, or ask another worthy bishop to do it for him, in order to avoid any more cost by
delays.184 Frederik’s admonition paid off and Mule became Bishop of Oslo, despite the
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fact that people knew that he had never lived according to the teachings of the Church.185
The example of Bishop Mule shows how Frederik and Denmark’s council interfered in
Norwegian affairs and strategically placed Danes in influential positions within Norway.
This particular event contradicted Frederik’s Norwegian charter which made it clear that
the Norwegian council should have the privilege of electing its own clergymen. Clearly
Denmark made decisions on issues that rightfully should have remained in the hands of
the Norwegian council.
Another issue, which Frederik ultimately took into his own hands, had to do with
the German presence in Bergen. This city, located on the Norwegian west coast, had had
a long tradition of trading fish, butter and hides with England.186 It is believed that the
Hanseatic League began trading in Bergen around the year 1250, when King Haakon IV
of Norway made a treaty with Lübeck, the center of Hanseatic trade.187 A thriving
commerce between the Hansa and Bergen stimulated Norway’s economic growth but the
main profit fell into the hands of the Germans, who in turn also gained significant control
in Bergen.188 The Germans in Bergen apparently often used violence to get what they
wanted or to keep others, especially merchants from the Netherlands, from trading there.
In some cases Germans tortured and murdered in Bergen without facing any
giffue andre verdwge fædræ oc biscoper ther i Norgis riigæ befalning oc fwld magtt att viæ hannem att
hand kand komme till same biscops domm vtenn ald ydher mere forhalning kost oc thæring.”
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consequences. Germans also took advantage of the situation after Christian II went into
exile in 1523, and heavily terrorized competitors, in particular the Scots.189
Frederik, then, concerned himself with the position of Lübeck and German
merchants in Bergen. Initially, after receiving word regarding German attacks on the
Scottish, he wrote to Norway’s council and asked them to look into the matter.190 The
Danish council, apparently acting independently of the king, also wrote to Norway and
asked that the council would take care of the Scottish who had been attacked, and make
some restitution to them. 191 The king actually never asked the Norwegians to deal with
the issue but decided to negotiate the matter himself. He wrote to Esge Bille:
Dear Esge…since last time we wrote you about the dealings between the German
merchants and the Scottish at the pier in Bergen, that it should be decided with a sum of
money…we kindly let you know that Lübeck has negotiated with us so that we have
taken the same case upon us to negotiate it to a final end…we then ask you that you
immediately would negotiate on our behalf with the same Scots so that they will settle
192
with eight hundred or one thousand marks of Lübeck.

As before, Frederik put this case into the hands of one of his trusted Danes in Norway
instead of using the council. It is unknown whether the Norwegian council ever acted
upon the admonition sent by the Danish council on this matter, which could explain why
Frederik chose to use other means. It is also likely that Frederik felt pressured by Lübeck
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to settle the matter, as Lübeck and its burghers had placed him on the Danish-Norwegian
throne. This example, however, shows that Frederik often took take care of Norwegian
issues outside of proper channels, using Danes with influential positions within Norway.
The presence of Danish nobles in Norway, although useful to Frederik, caused
contention and strife in the 1520s. Sources indicate that the German merchants in Bergen
actually acted upon instructions from Vincent Lunge.193 The fact that Frederik installed
several Danes in Norwegian positions, contrary to the charter of 1524, also caused rifts
among members of the Norwegian council. One important issue of contention related to
property rights given Danes like Krummedige, Lunge, Bille, and others.194 In fact, Lunge
and Bille destroyed old cultural institutions, like the Church of the Apostles in Bergen, in
order to use the bricks, in Lunge’s case to expand his Norwegian estate, and Bille to
strengthen Bergenshus. 195 In order to deal with internal problems in Norway, Frederik
sent his son, Duke Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, along with four Danish council
members, instead of going himself. He instructed the Norwegian inhabitants to assist and
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obey Christian as they would the King himself.196 Prior to Christian’s journey, Frederik
instructed him to deal with domestic conflicts in Norway and to deal with possible
supporters of Christian II.197
Duke Christian arrived in Norway supported by a large number of soldiers and
asserted his authority, seizing valuables belonging to the church. He also interfered in
land transactions. Vincent Lunge had sold Hårstad farm to a local farmer for one hundred
units of Danish currency, but Christian deprived this man of the farm he had bought and
only gave him half the money he had paid to obtain it.198 In some ways his actions
reflected things to come after the end of the Count’s War in 1536.199 His Norwegian visit
indicated that the relationship between Denmark and Norway had become rather onesided, meaning that the royal power of Denmark seemed determined to control and
dominate, while Norway gradually lost influence. Duke Christian ultimately failed to
fully achieve his mission. He never succeeded in rooting out support for Christian II in
Norway, a fact which became apparent when the former monarch landed a fleet there in
1531.
In November 1531, Christian II sailed up Oslo fjord with a fleet of fourteen ships
and thousands of foot soldiers. It is possible he chose Norway as a place of attack
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because it lacked a serious military defense.200 Perhaps he knew that many Norwegians,
in spite of national differences, would rally to his cause and give him needed support.
The most influential cleric in Norway, Olaf Engelbrektsson, provided vital support for
Christian II’s cause. He also served as a counterweight, in constantly challenging Danish
influence. Engelbrektsson received the title of Archbishop of Trondheim in May 1523,
and the Norwegian council appointed him without Danish interference.201 He replaced
Archbishop Erik Valkendorf who had died earlier that same year and also served as the
head of the Norwegian council.202
Earlier, on his way back from Rome after a visit with the pope, Engelbrektsson
had taken a detour and stopped in the Netherlands to visit the deposed Christian II.
During this visit, Engelbrektsson swore his allegiance to the exiled king but changed his
mind after returning to Norway, and promised allegiance to Frederik.203 Engelbrektsson,
however, shifted loyalties again when he learned of Christian II’s arrival. He explained
that he supported Christian II because Frederik had failed to keep his promises to
Norway.204 Despite this explanation, we might never know the real reasons behind his
shifting loyalties. It seems, however, he chose to follow whatever appeared the most
convenient path before him. He obviously must have deemed it necessary to support
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Frederik once he had established himself as the new monarch. It is also plausible, then,
that he supported Christian II out of convenience or necessity when he arrived in
Norway. In December 1531, Christian II expressed his friendship to the archbishopric in
Trondheim:
We Christian, make it known by our open letter that we, by our…kindness and grace
have promised…Olaf archbishop of Trondheim…continual friendship from us…and
Olaf archbishop shall never be questioned or denied…or suffer unkindly in any way
due to the action and union…Olaf…had against us and our friends with our enemy duke
Frederik…during our absence….We will hold the holy church here in our kingdom of
Norway… to the good old righteous and Christian freedoms and privileges….At the
same time we promise and pronounce that Olaf…in Trondheim must and should enjoy
using, for evermore, the rectory called Stenvikholm.205

Christian II appears to have valued the loyalty of Olaf Engelbrektsson. As the most
powerful member of the Norwegian clergy, it must have been significant for Christian to
regain the loyalty of this man. It also appears that Christian II, once he arrived in
Norway, saw himself as rightful ruler, granting privileges to the Church and its
Archbishop.
Sources also suggest that Christian II managed to find support in the general
Norwegian population. On 26 November 1531, Christian II informed Esge Bille of his
arrival and wrote: “Know that we, by the grace and mercy of the almighty God, have
come to our land and kingdom Norway again, and the bishops of Norway’s
council…knights, merchants and the common people here in the south have come over to
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us.”206 He must have convinced people to join his cause rather quickly since he could
send such a report the same month he arrived in Norway, if he indeed told Bille the truth.
And evidence does suggest that farmers and other people joined Christian II during his
first month in Norway.207 We might never know for sure why some Norwegians joined
Christian’s crusade so easily. Perhaps many Norwegians had issues with the way
Denmark controlled Norwegian affairs at the time, and welcomed a change. The fact
remains, however, that as king of Denmark-Norway, Christian II had levied heavy taxes
on the Norwegian population, which caused outbursts of protest, especially from the
farmers.208 Logically, then, if people in Norway had few serious issues with Frederik’s
rule, they would not, unless compelled, quickly join Christian. If they joined him
willingly, although few written records shed a thorough light on the issue, this might
indicate that certain numbers of Norway’s population disfavored the existing domination
from Denmark.
News that Norwegians, including Olaf Engelbrektsson, had joined with Christian
II, reached Denmark through people like Esge Bille, who in February 1532 wrote to
Johan Rantzau, Danish military commander, and his own brother, Bishop Ove Bille of
Århus, Denmark, informing them that the Norwegian Archbishop had betrayed his
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allegiance to Frederik.209 The Archbishop himself admitted to the Bishop of Bergen and
Esge Bille that he indeed had traveled to Oslo and sworn allegiance to Christian II. He
explained he had done this because Frederik had failed to live up to his promises towards
Norway and the Norwegian Church.210 Engelbrektsson helped Christian militarily, which
included supplying manpower and also sharing intelligence.211 Despite this support and
the fact that Christian had brought a significant number of soldiers on his quest, he failed
to conquer Norway’s main fortress Akershus. If Christian had succeeded in this endeavor
the outcome of his attack on Norway might have been quite different, considering that
Akershus constituted the most important fortress in Norway. In fact, Frederik thanked
Mogens Gyldenstjerne at Akershus for his successful defense of the fort and for his
faithful service to the king.212 Frederik, along with assistance from Gustav Vasa, sent a
fleet to Norway to defeat Christian’s forces. His intentions were clear: “We intend, with
our war ships, to send our foot soldiers and people of war into Norway so that we may
put down King Christian’s war and foot soldiers.”213 Simultaneously Frederik appealed to
Gyldenstjerne that he would persuade Christian II’s soldiers to leave Norway, to avoid

209

Esge Bille, “Letters to Johan Rantzau and Ove Bille,” February 1532, in Diplomatarium
Norwegicum, vol. 13, 640-644.
210

Olaf Engelbrektsson, “Letter to Bishop Olaf of Bergen and Esge Bille,” March 1532, in
Diplomatarium Norwegicum, vol. 12, 607-608.
211

Olaf Engelbrektsson, “Letter to Christian II,” June 1532, in Diplomatarium Norwegicum, vol.

9, 722.
212

Frederik I, “Letter to Mogens Gyldenstjerne,” April 1532, in Diplomatarium Norwegicum, vol.
12, 609-611.
213

“Wii nu agthe mett wor orlogs skibe att indschicke wore lanndskneckte ock kriigsfolck vdi
Norge.” Ibid., 611.

71

shedding the blood of other Christians, and also to avoid “a rumor that we were so
bloodthirsty and sought to shed the blood of so many pitiful people.”214
Frederik also reported to Gyldenstjerne that he had captured five of Christian’s
warships and sent needed supplies and reinforcements to Oslo’s fortress.215 Christian’s
crusade ended in May 1532, when he agreed to go to Copenhagen after receiving a
promise of free travel to negotiate with his uncle. Frederik, however, failed to live up to
his promise, and arrested Christian, who spent the rest of his life imprisoned in
Copenhagen.216 After Christian’s imprisonment, Olaf Engelbrektsson again swore his
allegiance to Frederik through Vincent Lunge and another Dane by the name of Nils
Lykke in September 1532.217 Frederik died in April 1533, about a year after he managed
to end the threat from his nephew.
Christian II’s invasion would most likely have provided the greatest opportunity
for Frederik’s men in Norway to betray their loyalty to him. However, evidence shows
that the Danes Frederik had sent to maintain order and control in Norway stood by him.
Gyldenstjerne defended Akershus Fortress in Oslo while others refused to support
Christian’s efforts. Esge Bille and Vincent Lunge reported to the Bishop of Stavanger
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that they had both rejected appeals from Christian to support him.218 At perhaps the most
crucial moment, then, Frederik’s Danish supporters in Norway helped him defeat
Christian II.
Succession Crisis and the Count’s War
Frederik I’s death caused a ripple effect in Scandinavia. The question as to who
should replace him ultimately led to a civil war in Denmark which escalated with the
invasion by the Hanseatic town of Lübeck in 1534. The Danish and Norwegian councils
had the responsibility to announce Frederik’s successor, Duke Christian of SchleswigHolstein serving as the most likely candidate. Shortly after Frederik’s death, the Danish
council wrote to Engelbrektsson and informed him of events and invited its Norwegian
counterpart to
negotiate and decide on… a day of lords here in the kingdom…and thereafter let us
know by writing on what time and place you and the other good men…can best make it
there. We, Denmark’s council, will do our best to submit to your good will and attend
same meeting and then, with you and more from Norway’s council, by the aid of God,
gather together and consider…the welfare of these two kingdoms.219

This call for Norwegian members of the council to meet in Denmark suggests that the
Danes remembered the agreement made in 1450, namely that any decision regarding
succession required the presence of both councils. As events transpired, no election day
occurred in 1533. Instead the Danish council decided to postpone the election of
218
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Frederik’s successor until the following year.220 The real reason behind the postponement
is not known for sure. One reason might have been that the Danish council wanted to
wait until Norway’s council could make it to Denmark, so that a decision could be made
together, thus maintaining the status of the councils and its members.221 Another idea
revolves around the fact that the most important question for the Danish council had to do
with religion, namely the issue of whether Denmark-Norway should have a Catholic or
Protestant king, since Duke Christian followed the teachings of Martin Luther.222 The fact
that the Danes asked Engelbrektsson and the other councilors to find a time best suited
for them to meet indicates that the Danish council valued its relationship with the
Norwegians or at least respected their position in this regard.
The Danes issued another invitation to attend a meeting in Copenhagen during the
summer of 1534. Engelbrektsson responded to the Danish council that he himself, for
uncertain reasons, could not make it to Denmark but had given other members the
authority to go in his behalf.223 The outbreak of the Count’s War, however, prevented this
from taking place, and the war eventually paved the way for Duke Christian to replace his
father. He took the lead in fighting back Lübeck’s mercenary Count Christoffer of
Oldenburg, through his military commander Johan Rantzau. Although Norway never
actively got involved in the Count’s War, Duke Christian kept diplomatic ties with those
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in power to assist him on his way to the throne. In February 1535 he addressed Norway’s
council with a warning and a plea:
[Lübeck’s] true act and purpose is, as it always has been, to be able to capture these
three kingdoms under their power….We therefore ask and admonish you to seriously
take to heart and consider the eternal welfare and prosperity of your own and these
kingdoms and to stand firm…by us…and Denmark’s council….When the almighty
allows that we come to you, we will hold you by Norway’s…privileges, freedoms, and
good old Christian habits…so that these two well-known old Christian kingdoms must
thereafter remain together, as they have been for a long time, and that they must by no
means be separated.224

Duke Christian revealed that he apparently desired to maintain the relationship that
Denmark and Norway had had for so many years. Future events, however, showed that
his actual intentions were more complex. Although Christian had not yet become king,
his role as the leader of the opposition to Lübeck and Count Christoffer put him in a
strong position to negotiate for support from Norway’s council. He obviously saw
himself as the natural successor, offering to maintain and preserve Norwegian rights and
privileges.
Christian received a response from Engelbrektsson that the Norwegian council
would gather together in Trondheim to discuss and ultimately make a decision regarding
his standing as the next king.225 This letter failed to give Christian a direct answer to his
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plea, but promised one in the future.226 Norwegian councilors negotiated among
themselves in order to find an appropriate time to deicide the issue. The Bishop of Oslo
suggested to Engelbrektsson that the meeting be held that summer in Trondheim.227 Such
a meeting never took place. The Bishop of Oslo and other members of the council later
informed the Archbishop that they could not come to Trondheim at the appointed time.228
Instead of making a decision together as a whole, then, members of the council in
southern Norway had taken the matter into their own hands and announced their decision
in May 1535:
Norway’s council here south in the kingdom, in the name of the Holy Trinity give, with
this open letter…Christian with Gods grace as chosen king of Denmark…and a mighty
lord and reigning king of Norway’s kingdom…and we will be the subjects of His
Grace’s royal majesty…who should be our Norway’s rightful chosen...king.229

Without the consent of their leader, these members of the council openly hailed Christian
III as the next king of Denmark and Norway. Perhaps this reflected the fact that
Engelbrektsson had failed to exert tight control over the council as a whole, and
questioned his influence. Some of the Norwegian counselors seem to have felt a pressing
join in his efforts to restore the ‘old union’ and fight to reinstate the deposed king. It is uncertain whether
Engelbrektsson ever replied to this request. For details, see Diplomatarium Norwegicum, vol. 16, 706-707.
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need to speed up the process of electing a king, by not waiting for the meeting in
Trondheim. The content of this same letter suggests that the suffering in Denmark caused
by the Count’s War made these men anxious to elect a man strong enough to end the
conflict. They did, however, demand that Christian III respect Norway’s established
rights and privileges.230 A few months later, Engelbrektsson informed the Bishop in Oslo
that he agreed, and joined with their decision.231
Engelbrektsson’s support of Christian III, however, failed to last long. As the
head of the Norwegian Church, his foremost interest would have been to protect
Catholicism in Norway. Since Christian’s religious tendencies leaned heavily towards
Lutheranism it comes as no surprise that Engelbrektsson struggled with the idea of
having a Lutheran king over Denmark-Norway. At meetings in December through
January 1535-36, Engelbrektsson met with several members of the council, including
important Danes like Vincent Lunge and Esge Bille, to discus the position of Christian
III. Despite the fact that he had in September 1535 announced that he supported the new
king, the Archbishop changed position, and allegedly had some of the councilors
murdered.232 Word of these events reached Christian III in February 1536:
I have now received certain knowledge from Trondheim that the Archbishop has had
Vincent [Lunge] killed and captured Bishop Hans Reff, Esge Bille and Claus Bille and
had killed Niels Lykke on Christmas eve, it is said that the Archbishop had him
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suffocated by smoke. And he has several…men to the south to persuade the public to
remove Your Grace’s support.233

The death of two Danes in powerful positions in Norway underscores the considerable
Norwegian resistance to Danish influence. Engelbrektsson’s acts constitute the most
radical revolt or demonstration of an influential personality against Denmark in this
period. Although it is uncertain whether Niels Lykke was actually “smoked” to death on
the Archbishop’s order, as this source claims, the fact that these two men died at the
hands of Norwegians shows that anti-Danish sentiments existed in Trondheim.
Engelbrektsson did not act alone, and had the help of local inhabitants in Trondheim who
joined his revolt.234 Esge Bille and the others suffered no injury and were released shortly
after.235 The author of this passage fails to indicate where he obtained this information,
and so its content might be somewhat exaggerated. However, it remains true that Lunge
and Lykke lost their lives.236 Vincent Lunge’s brother, Ove Lunge, wrote a letter to Esge
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Bille in Bergen and asked him to provide aid and comfort to the grieving widow and
children of Vincent, and requested that those responsible for the murder be punished.237
It has been suggested that one of the reasons for Engelbrektsson’s behavior was
the fact that another candidate for Denmark-Norway’s throne had arrived on the scene,
the powerful Count-Palatine Frederik, whose wife, Dorothea, Daughter of Christian II
and niece of Charles V, had his eyes on Denmark. In fact, as the daughter of Christian II
and his wife Queen Isabella, sister of Charles V, Dorothea should have been the heir to
the Danish throne after her father. When this news reached the Norwegian Archbishop, it
immediately captured his interest in light of the Count Palatine’s connection to Charles
V, Europe’s greatest defender of Catholicism.238 The Count Palatine actually appealed to
the Habsburg court in Brussels for possible assistance in order to secure ‘Habsburg’
interests in Denmark.239 Because Charles V had his hands full with a war against France,
the Danish question was a lower priority for him.240 Charles V, however, did order a fleet
to bring aid to Copenhagen. This fleet was to set sail in the summer of 1536 and to
consist of thirty large ships and twelve smaller ships or ‘boyars’ including two Flemish
sloops at each end.241 Despite the preparation to aid Lübeck and place Count Palatine on
the Danish throne, however, the war in Denmark was lost by the time the fleet was ready
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to sail. It is unlikely Engelbrektsson knew of these preparations because in an open letter
dated 6 April 1536, he recognized Christian III as king and begged for his forgiveness.242
Despite his desperate attempts to save Catholicism in Norway, the Archbishop
failed to secure its future. He could not prevent Christian III, a Lutheran, from becoming
the next king of Denmark-Norway. Christian managed to secure his election as king,
mostly due to his efforts in the Count’s War. Count Christopher and Lübeck’s men
experienced early success in the Danish crusade. Copenhagen and the heavily fortified
Copenhagen castle fell to their control in June 1534, and they managed to persuade
disgruntled Danes to join them. The resistance from Christian III along with efforts of his
military commander Johan Rantzau and Swedish assistance, soon stunted the attempts to
overrun Denmark.243 In his successful attempt to defeat the Count and Lübeck’s
mercenaries, Christian managed to gather enough support to secure his position as future
king of Denmark-Norway. Through a series of battles in various locations in Denmark,
the most famous being the battle of Øksnebjerg on the island of Fyn, Christian
surrounded the Count and his loyal followers in Copenhagen.244 The siege of
Copenhagen lasted long enough to deplete supplies necessary for survival within the city
of Copenhagen and on 29 July 1536, Count Christoffer and his men surrendered to Duke
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Christian. The inhabitants of Copenhagen received Christian as their rightful monarch,
and he became from that time King Christian III.245
Once established as King, Christian sent 1500 soldiers to Norway to deal with
Engelbrektsson and his supporters.246 Esge Bille, who commanded the King’s troops in
Norway, caused a great deal of damage. In a letter to Bille, Engelbrektsson wrote that the
Danish troops had “pillaged all our churches…in Sundmøre and in Romsdal and have
burned rectories…and have heavily taxed the poor…along with many other unchristian
acts, which are too numerous to record.”247 It is hard to know for sure how much damage
Norway suffered under the rampage of Christian’s soldiers. The population in the costal
regions was particularly vulnerable to attack, while the Archbishop had the advantage of
distance and resources.248 However, the use of force clearly indicates that the new king
had a harsher policy in mind for Norway. The Bishops of Hamar and Stavanger were
both arrested by Christian’s men because they had failed to support him as king. The
Bishop of Oslo, who had supported Christian, on the other hand, retained his position,
and in time made a convenient conversion to Lutheranism.249 Christian’s men only faced
military opposition at Stensvikholm Fortress in Trondheim, but the population-at-large
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failed to put up any resistance.250 The presence of Christian’s forces also intimidated
Engelbrektsson enough for him to announce his departure from his native country.251 In
early April 1537, he set sail for the Netherlands where he remained until his death the
following year.252
The struggle of Engelbrektsson offers insight into a relationship between
Denmark and Norway that was unstable at best. As head of the Norwegian Council, he
fought a lonely battle against powerful Danes within Norway. Although it might be
impossible to know if he fought equally hard for Norwegian independence, as for
preserving the Catholic faith, he represented a voice against Danish dominance at the
time. His actions, especially in regard to the deaths of Lunge and Lykke, seem rather
brutal and rash, but most likely demonstrate his desperation. The position of the
Norwegian Council and its ability to act appears to have diminished extensively after
Frederik I came to the throne. Frederick’s determination to control Norwegian affairs by
placing his own men in strategic positions throughout Norway, violating his promises in
the process, deteriorated a relationship that had been more equal in the past. It seems the
Danish Council, however, was willing to include Norway in proclaiming a new king in
1533-34. The Count’s War intervened and paved the way for Christian III, who most
likely would have ignored Norway’s Council, despite the fact that he contacted it and
asked for its support.
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Christian’s evolving attitude towards Norway became clear in his Danish
Coronation Charter of October 1536:
Because Norway is now reduced in both power and wealth, and the inhabitants of
Norway’s kingdom alone cannot support a ruler or king…and a majority of Norway’s
council, especially Archbishop Olaf…have failed to fulfill their obligations towards
Denmark…then it shall, from this time onward, be and remain under the crown of
Denmark like to the other lands of Jutland, Fyn or Skåne, and shall hereafter neither be
nor be called a separate kingdom, but rather be a part of Denmark and under Denmark’s
crown for evermore.253

Given a dearth of sources, little is known about negotiations during the days when the
charter was written.254 It is also difficult to know exactly what the King and the Danish
Council actually meant by the paragraph cited although it seems that Norway was to be a
province of Denmark.255 The charter indicates that Norway, according to Denmark, could
not financially support itself and thus needed to be under Danish rule. Christian had
evidently become disgruntled by Norwegian members of council who had failed to live
up to their promises. In his new position of power, Christian III abolished the Norwegian
Council, eradicating an established institution of Norway’s political life and influence.256
This signaled a profound change in the relationship between the two countries.
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This relationship had deteriorated ever since Frederik I came to the throne. He had
kept Norway’s aristocracy in check by placing his own men in vital positions throughout
the country. He also alienated the Council by making decisions about Norwegian issues
without involving Council members, clear violations of his previous promises. The result
of the Count’s War dictated that Norway loose the little influence it had managed to
retain whereas Danes continued to hold important positions in the country. The union
between Denmark and Norway after 1536, and until 1814, excluded Norwegians from
participation in government to such a degree that the concept of union during that time
actually meant government from afar and foreign domination.257 Although Sweden had
felt the brutal effects of ‘foreign’ domination under Christian II, it still maintained close
ties to Denmark, forged by their mutual assistance during the Count’s War, which
ultimately resulted in Scandinavian peace until 1563.
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Chapter III: Swedish-Danish Relations Prior to and During the Count’s
War
During the summer of 1533, a rumor circulated in Danish noble circles of
impending Swedish hostility towards Denmark. That same summer, Gustav Vasa, King
of Sweden, sent a letter to the Danish National Council, stating:
We let you know…since you, good men, have some feelings of discontent towards us,
that we would desire to be aggressive towards Denmark’s kingdom, that we never have
(God knowing) thought or intended to do so….Therefore we kindly ask that you do not
believe or put any trust to such treachery.…We have, with the help of God, always
stayed true to the union between these kingdoms.258

In this passage, Gustav Vasa confirmed his friendly intentions towards Denmark and
alluded to a union between the two countries.259 Although there might have been many
reasons why he wanted to disclaim any rumors of hostility, it indicates that Vasa desired
to maintain a peaceful relationship with his Scandinavian neighbor. It is interesting that
these two countries, which only ten years earlier had been engaged in a bitter struggle due
to Sweden’s fight for independence under Gustav’s leadership, had formed a closer
relationship by this time.
Denmark- Sweden and the Kalmar Union
As regards Denmark and Sweden, the Kalmar Union did not exist without
friction. These two countries struggled over issues of domination in places like Gotland,
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an island off the east coast of Sweden, throughout the fifteenth century.260 When
Christian II came to the Danish throne in 1513, struggles escalated and turned into a civil
war, fought between Danish pro-union and Swedish anti-union forces.261 Gustav Vasa
fell captive to Danish troops under Christian II in 1518, but managed to return to Sweden
in May 1520.262 The Swedish-Danish conflict climaxed in November 1520, when
Christian II executed, despite promises of friendship, over eighty men of the Swedish
nobility and clergy in the infamous “Stockholm Bloodbath”. Through this action,
Christian intended to wipe out any opposition to his rule in Sweden.263
Following the Stockholm Bloodbath, Gustav Vasa, who lost close relatives to
Christian’s carnage, including his father Erik Johansson, traveled throughout Sweden to
gather support for his cause against Denmark and Christian II. Gustav belonged to a
family with old roots in Uppland, Sweden, an area close to Stockholm. His family
belonged to the Swedish nobility and his father owned a significant amount of land.264
From Gustav’s own writings, it is clear that he never forgot the wrong that Christian II
had done to him, his family, and the Union.265 However, Gustav experienced great
success in his endeavors and managed to rally support in various parts of the country. His
success has partly been accredited to his strong personality and his unique skills in public
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speaking.266 Despite this, he still needed help to achieve victory over the Danes. He
received aid from the Hanseatic town of Lübeck, which sent a fleet to help in his
endeavors.267 With Lübeck’s assistance, Gustav successfully drove the Danes out of
Sweden by the summer of 1523, with exception of the areas of Skåne and Bornholm, and
on 6 June, he was acclaimed King of Sweden. Christian II, on the other hand, was forced
to abdicate and fled to the Netherlands. Gustav Vasa’s ascension to the Swedish throne
marked the beginning of a long rule by the Vasa family. Without Lübeck’s help,
however, Gustav would most likely not have been able to defeat the Danes. PaludanMüller wrote that “without the assistance of Lübeck, Gustav Vasa would never have been
able to remove the executioners axe from the hands of Christian the Second or to put the
crown of Sweden on his head.”268 Although Gustav has often been portrayed as the father
of the modern Sweden, his rule did face challenges from within his own kingdom. A
number of popular uprisings occurred in 1527, 1530, and 1542. Gustav responded to
these by violently repressing those who opposed him.269
Shortly before Gustav ascended the throne in Sweden, a new king replaced the
abdicated Christian. The town of Lübeck, in addition to its Swedish involvement, also
conspired to place Frederik of Schleswig- Holstein, or Frederik I, Christian II’s uncle, on
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the Danish throne, in March 1523.270 Frederik I enjoyed a rather short reign challenged
by internal conflicts, until he passed away in April 1533. Letters and correspondence
available from this period reveal that Sweden and Denmark managed to maintain, despite
their troubled history, a close diplomatic relationship and eventual military cooperation.
In other words, we will see that although the Kalmar Union had ended, these two
countries continued to work together to face foreign threats and retained diplomatic ties.
Gustav Vasa and Frederik I
To get a better view of Denmark and Sweden’s relationship and cooperation
during this period, we will begin by looking at Gustav Vasa and Frederik I’s interactions.
One issue of tension was Sweden’s attempt to incorporate the area of Skåne. Historians
have suggested that although it appears that Frederik had a fair relationship with his
neighbor, he secretly never abandoned the thought of possible dominion over Sweden.271
It is apparent, however, since Denmark was in control of Gotland, Blekinge and Skåne,
that Frederik was content enough to maintain a peaceful relationship.272 There are,
however, a few examples of issues which occupied Frederik: on 9 June 1523, three days
after Gustav Vasa became King, Frederick addressed the Swedes in a letter where he
reminded them that he had driven Christian II out, and encouraged them to consider the
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benefits for the three kingdoms if they chose him as king in accordance with the old
union.273
This was a bold move by Frederik, who must have realized, at least to a certain
extent, the level of resentment in the Swedish population towards the Danes. It is
uncertain whether he knew that Sweden had already crowned a king, or that such an
event was imminent. Frederik actually repeated this message on 17 June, and by this date
we can assume he realized that Sweden had already chosen Vasa. Frederik’s attempt to
bring the three countries together in 1523 does show that he had hopes of returning to the
old union, but there are no indications that he harbored such hopes throughout his-ten
year reign. In fact, Frederik and Gustav entered into agreements, in September 1524 and
August 1528, to assist each other in the likelihood of an attack by Christian II.274 When
Christian II attacked Norway in 1531, Gustav realized that this threatened Sweden as
much as Denmark, and honored his pledge by joining a Danish counter-attack to drive
Christian out.275
An example of how these monarchs worked together also occurred in September
1524, when Frederik and Gustav agreed to exchange escaped citizens from each country,
and if any member of court or apprentice are separated from their master in Denmark
and proceed to our kingdom, Sweden, without permission…and he is wanted by
writing, then shall he immediately be sent back to Denmark again…and answer for his
own actions…and, similarly, if any member of court in Sweden separate from his
master…and go to Denmark…then he shall…be sent back to Sweden.276
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Although the issue involved might appear insignificant, it does show that Gustav
and Frederik cooperated early on in their reigns as ‘new’ monarchs of Sweden and
Denmark-Norway.
Another issue had to do with Viken, an area close to the Oslo Fjord. Gustav Vasa,
however, decided to occupy this area in 1523.277 Although this could have resulted in
increased hostility and even a military response from Denmark, the two countries solved
the problem diplomatically. In 1530, Denmark and Sweden agreed that Gustav Vasa
could occupy Viken for another six years.278 Two years later, after negotiating with
Frederik’s representative, Klaus Bille, Gustav agreed, for an annual fee, to hand Viken
back to Denmark-Norway.279 In an open letter, Vasa explained that he had “to Denmark’s
crown delivered Viken for a piece of gold, which [Klaus Bille] shall deliver to
Lübeck.”280 A peaceful outcome resulted from Sweden’s occupation of Viken, which also
helped Gustav repay some of his debt to Lübeck.
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Towards the end of 1533, some months after Frederik’s death, Vasa approached
the Danish National Council in a letter. In it Gustav laments Frederik’s death, and stated
he was saddened that he and Sweden have lost such a dear friend and neighbor. He wrote
that Frederik’s “death is a complete sorrow and discomfort of the heart, and we have for
this reason met you with great compassion”281 Such condolences were common and
perhaps a formality among neighboring kingdoms. In this case, the remark came in a
letter which responded to a Danish request to Sweden which addressed several issues. It
is difficult to know for sure whether Gustav wrote in sincerity or out of duty, and whether
he actually meant anything by his remarks. However, since he took time to address this
along with other issues, it suggests that he had been affected somehow by Frederik’s
death and that the two kings shared a relationship of mutual respect. There is also a
strong possibility that Vasa had written the National Council or others in Denmark about
Frederik’s death earlier than this, as it appears strange he would wait until November to
send condolences for Frederik’s passing which occurred April.
In December 1533, Vasa addressed an audience of godparents, most likely
Danish nobles, and wrote that God, through His tender mercy, had blessed him and his
queen with a son.282 On the occasion of the boy’s christening, Vasa invited the Danish
godparents to “suffer the inconvenience for our sake to come to Stockholm at the
prescribed time and make yourselves merry with us and other of our lords and good
281
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friends…[for] that good part which God has given us, we would like to share with
you.”283 Although it might have been a common practice to invite neighboring nobles to
such events, this shows that Vasa had put aside at least some of his resentment towards
the Danes, and used the occasion to encourage friendship with the Danish nobility. Likely
that some of the Swedish and Danish nobility at the time were related through marriage,
as it had been common during the Kalmar Union for Swedes to own property and spend
time on Danish lands and vise versa.Vasa was himself related to Christian III through
marriage as well. Other examples of interaction with the Danes come from the spring and
summer of that same year as Gustav evinced a keen interest in Danish attitudes towards
Lübeck.
Lübeck
It is virtually impossible to write about this topic without a discussion of Lübeck’s
continual involvement in the Baltic. In a constant search for expanded Hanseatic
domination and monopoly in the area, Lübeck found itself on the path towards war with
the Netherlands, which also had trading interests in the region.284 Lübeck approached
both Sweden and Denmark and suggested that they too ought to join in the war against
the Netherlands. Vasa most likely found himself trapped between a rock and a hard place
because of indebtedness to Lübeck incurred during Sweden’s war against Denmark.
On 5 May 1533, Vasa drew up a letter to Frederik I regarding Lübeck’s
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negotiations with the Danes concerning relations with the Netherlands. In it, Gustav
discussed how Lübeck had written to Sweden and requested it join in the war effort along
with Denmark. He also expressed astonishment that Denmark had not informed him that
representatives from Lübeck had previously traveled to Denmark in search of support for
the war.285 In the same letter, Vasa asked how Denmark viewed the whole situation of a
possible war with the Netherlands.286 Two months later, Vasa followed up with a similar
letter, this time addressed to the Danish National Council, seeking Danish support:
We… wrote and requested the mind and opinion of you good men about the struggle
between Lübeck and the Netherlands….As of now we have not obtained a final
answer…we desire that you would let us know how you feel about the struggle.287

It appears Vasa had a keen interest in what Denmark intended to do. Although he most
likely could have acted completely independent of Denmark, as no official agreement
existed at this point, he still kept a close watch on his neighbor and its intentions. In the
same letter he tried to convince the Danes that a joint war with Lübeck would not be
worthwhile, because the war simply had nothing to do with either of them, and that
Lübeck had no other intention than to create tensions and rifts between Sweden and
Denmark, following in the footsteps of their old habit.288 In the middle of the struggle
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with Lübeck, Gustav seems to have started attempts to build up a healthy relationship
with Denmark. His letters indicate that he took the initiative as he openly sought council
and opinion from the Danish Council and offered advice at the same time. As it turns out,
neither Sweden nor Denmark assisted Lübeck against the Netherlands, and in many ways
this represented the beginning of close cooperation between Sweden and Denmark.
In addition to seeking and offering advice, Gustav also asked the Danish Council
to write a letter to Lübeck on Sweden’s behalf, as a means of diplomacy. In fact, he sent a
copy of a draft of a letter he thought would be ideal and asked the Danes to add whatever
they thought useful.289 This might have been an unusual request, and it is hard to know if
he actually expected this to be followed up. Evidence suggests, however, that the Danish
council did in fact comply with Gustav’s request.290
This does not mean, however, that Gustav did not express his opinions to the
Danes when he saw fit. He did on occasion write blunt messages to the Council. One
such message, in a letter written in April 1534, about a month before the start of the
Count’s War, had to do with issues surrounding Denmark’s supposed trade with Lübeck.
Although Lübeck had ended its war against the Netherlands by this time, it remained
hostile towards Sweden throughout this period, due to Gustav’s failure to pay his
financial debt.291 About the Danish trade with Lübeck, Gustav wrote:
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Furthermore…it is of great surprise to us, how Lübeck has such great dealings in
Denmark with this and the other. They are purchasing large amounts of oxen…and are
eating beyond all fashion, by which we wonder, especially after the existing agreement
which details how no kingdom should favor the other kingdom’s enemies by aiding or
supplying them with provisions, food or other comforts. We therefore ask you to make
it known, by your writing, how we are to understand this.292

If based on accurate information, this offers descriptive details about Danish activity and
trade with Lübeck as the Count’s War drew near. Vasa, however, did not use harsh
language but merely asked the Danes what they were doing, and gently reminded them of
a mutual agreement.293 The nature of this reprimand or reminder indicates that Vasa
never desired to create hostile sentiments among the Danish councilors.
The Swedish-Danish Agreement of 1534
The most detailed and significant agreement of cooperation between Sweden and
Denmark since the breakup of the Kalmar Union came about in February 1534. Danish
nobles Niels Lunge, Axel Jull, and Truid Ulfstand traveled to Stockholm and met with
Vasa and the Swedish Council to arrange cooperation and assistance in case of foreign
attacks on Sweden or Denmark-Norway.294 It is believed this agreement was the product
of Danish determination to get Vasa’s support against Lübeck.295 However, Vasa
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received the Danish delegates with open arms in January 1534 and the parties reached an
agreement by 2 February.296 The Danish National Council failed to convene in 1534 and
so the agreement was not ratified that year.297 However, Duke Christian ratified the
agreement the following year and applied during the Count’s War.298 It is therefore
important to get a better insight into the agreement, at least to get Gustav’s perception of
it, especially since he appears to have considered it a valid agreement.
Some of Vasa’s letters offer significant insight into the nature of the agreement.
He referred to it as an eternal and friendly agreement forged between Denmark’s noble
messengers and Sweden’s council and all it its inhabitants.299 In a letter to Claus Bilde,
Danish Council member, Gustav wrote about the agreement and outlined some of its key
points. He assumed that
The ambassadors and messengers for the Danish council have announced the friendly
actions, agreements and assistance which these three kingdoms have agreed on in the
name of the Holy Trinity…how one kingdom should be committed to come to the help,
assistance, and aid with all possible power…[and] hope in the name of the almighty
God, that when these three kingdoms are bound together and are willing to stand
300
together, that no one, including Lübeck, will have much progress here.
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It appears the agreement served a military function for defensive measures. Gustav
also mentioned that none of the three countries should engage in any form of trade
with potential enemies.301 It is clear from Vasa’s statements that Lübeck loomed as
an enemy for the three countries. Historically, Lübeck had had hostile dealings with
Sweden, and at the time Vasa wrote the letter he was under pressure from Lübeck.
By a strange coincidence, the letter was written about a month before Count
Christoffer of Oldenburg attacked Denmark on behalf of Lübeck. It is important to
note that Vasa referred to three kingdoms and not two. This was natural, as Norway
belonged to Denmark and therefore fell under the agreement, even though
Norwegian delegates had no voice in the matter. Thus, the agreement included
Norway and played a vital role in Sweden and Denmark’s relationship during the
Count’s War.302 As we will see, the two countries shared intelligence and supported
each other militarily during the war, indicating a willingness to establish a closer
relationship then they had enjoyed for years.
One aspect of Sweden and Denmark’s cooperation in the time leading up to
and during the Count’s War, was connected with sharing intelligence. In July 1534, a
month after Lübeck’s attack on Denmark, Gustav wrote Henrik Rosenkrands, officer
of law at Jutland, and informed him of Lübeck’s actions.303 He wrote about a
supposed scheme by Lübeck to lay siege to Dutch ships in the Baltic in order to use
301
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them as reinforcement to their existing fleet.304 He continued this warning with a
proposal that Denmark and Sweden do the same thing, namely capture Dutch ships
and “take the advantage to strengthen ourselves with them as Lübeck, our enemy,
has done.”305
Later that same month, Vasa wrote to the inhabitants of Copenhagen:
We have discerned, through certain knowledge, how Lübeck has in mind, through some
secret plan and treachery, to engage in a hostile attack and action against you…and
wish to place Christian [II] back on the Danish throne again….Therefore we pray,
advise and admonish you all…not to put any faith or trust in Lübeck or their design
regarding King Christian, as it is not King Christian that is truly on their mind, rather it
306
is to cause these three kingdoms eternal damage and despair.

Vasa offered a voice of warning to Copenhagen and reminded them of the imminent
danger of a possible return of Christian II through Lübeck’s efforts. More important
was his attempt to persuade the Copenhageners not to assist Lübeck in the war,
indicating Vasa’s diplomatic attempts to strengthen Scandinavian efforts against the
German instigator. In the same letter he also encouraged them to stand by Frederik
I’s son, Duke Christian.307 Despite Gustav’s efforts, Copenhagen fell to Lübeck and
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Count Christopher shortly thereafter. Vasa received intelligence concerning the fall
of Copenhagen to Lübeck most likely at the end of July 1534.308
With its future tied to trade in the Baltic and exemption from sound dues,
Lübeck, under leadership of Jürgen Wullenwever, made a desperate attempt to mold
the Danish succession crisis to meet its own interests. Wullenwever, a Lutheran
merchant and politician, became burgomaster of Lübeck in 1533.309 In light of
Wullenwever’s efforts to convince the Danes to join him in Lübeck’s struggle
against the Netherlands, he set his hopes on helping Christian II regain the throne.310
Two other options also existed. Count Christopher of Oldenburg, who belonged to
the Oldenburg line, could serve as a candidate for the Danish throne.311 It also
appears that Henry VIII of England might have been a possible candidate in the mind
of Wullenwever. Marcus Meyer, an adventurer from Lübeck, went to England in
1533 and gained enough favor from Henry to become knighted. Wullenwever
subsequently drew up a treaty with Henry VIII in 1534 that increased England’s
influence in the Baltic, through assisting Lübeck militarily in attempting to seize
Denmark’s vacant throne.312 However, this treaty was completely abandoned a year
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later.313 For some unknown reason, Lübeck never ratified the treaty, thereby
precluding any English assistance in the Count’s War.314
Accordingly, Wullenwever and Lübeck had to rely solely on German
mercenaries and Count Christopher. In 1534, the Count penned an agreement with
Lübeck and Wullenwever, which outlined Wullenwever’s design regarding control
of the Danish throne. This agreement stated that “after [Christian II’s ] death no king
shall be chosen without the co-operation, agreement and goodwill of the town of
Lübeck….We shall use our best endeavors to ensure that…Denmark and Norway
will accept [this].”315 The agreement also stipulated that Lübeck remain in control of
Bornholm and destroy the fortress in Bergen which had caused “so many
dissensions.”316 Lübeck, then, focused on total control of Denmark, along with
increasing its overall influence in the Baltic. Since Wullenwever constituted the
mastermind behind the Count’s War, he had to face the consequences of its failure.
On 24 September 1537, he was executed beheaded, drawn and quartered.317
In addition to sharing intelligence of Lübeck’s undertakings with
Copenhagen, Vasa also warned inhabitants of Skåne and Blekinge, two provinces
under Danish control in southern Sweden, of Lübeck’s hostility. He informed them
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that Holstein and Denmark had been attacked by Lübeck which, according to
Gustav, wanted to place a foreign king in Denmark:
Our enemy Lübeck, which has attacked Denmark and installed…an unknown and
foreign lord, whom they intend to place as lord and king…and suppress you of all
privileges and freedoms….We let you all know, both rich and poor, the unhappy result
of ending up under an unknown lordship….Therefore we advise and admonish you
all…not to let yourselves be deceived or betrayed away from the noble Duke Christian,
our dear brother-in-law, and Denmark’s national council.318

A significant aspect of this letter is Vasa’s diplomatic attempt to persuade Skåne not
to take the side of Lübeck, but instead accept and support Duke Christian of
Holstein. Although Duke Christian had not yet become king of Denmark, he played a
major role in Danish attempts to drive Lübeck and Count Christoffer out of
Denmark. Gustav referred to the fact that he had a family tie to Duke Christian,
which might explain why he insisted Skåne should be loyal to him.319 Another
reason Gustav wanted Skåne to be loyal might have been that it bordered his own
lands, and he had little interest in having Lübeck so close to him. The fact that he
encouraged Danes to stand on the side of the Duke also indicates his dedication to a
common cause. Vasa acted in the interest not only of himself, but of Denmark. The
agreement of February 1534, as far as Gustav was concerned, applied and might
have encouraged his diplomatic attempts as well.
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Gustav acted diplomatically with Skåne on other occasions as well. In one
instance he instructed his army leaders to act cautiously in their interaction with the
Danes: “see to that you do not commit any harsh acts towards the Danish
gentlemen…we should aid and comfort them with all our power.”320 It appears that
Gustav wanted to avoid any clashes with the Danes in Skåne and that he remained
committees to giving help and support. The most significant aspect of this, however,
is that Gustav did indicate that he willingly kept his promises and wanted to keep a
peaceful relationship with Denmark.
As time passed, however, these areas fell under control of Lübeck. Prior to
Skåne’s fall, Vasa attempted to get the council to accept and support Duke Christian.
Vasa wrote to Vincent Lunge in Norway, informed him of the current status,
expressed surprise over the fact that the inhabitants of these regions would negotiate
with Count Christoffer, since they previously accepted the leadership of Duke
Christian321 In this situation, Vasa informed the Council of Skåne that, “since you
have accommodated Count Christoffer we have to leave it to God in Heaven and put
it into His Hands and let events transpire according to His Divine Will.”322
Evidence suggests that Vasa engaged himself in correspondence with the
Danes in order to warn and offer advice as hostilities loomed. There are, however,
320
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only a few examples of the Danes following a similar practice. The Danish
nobleman, Tyge Krabbe, wrote to Vasa and informed him of Lübeck’s activities with
the Netherlands in the Baltic. Vasa replied, expressing his appreciation.323 In another
instance, Vasa received intelligence regarding Lübeck from Danish nobleman Claus
Bilde, to which he applied:
We have in these days received your writing and letter where you make it known unto
us regarding how things are with Lübeck. How they now have been in a meeting with
the Dutch in Bremen in order to enter into friendship with them again and with the help
of others, bring all evil to the Swedish kingdom in order to place whomever they desire
as king here.324

This passage, to Bilde, gives us some sense of what intelligence the Danes shared
with Sweden. The fact that there are only a few examples available does not
necessarily rule out the possibility that the Danes neglected to share vital
information. There is, however, evidence that Gustav had issues with the kind of
information he received about the progress and the state of the war in Denmark.
In January 1534, Vasa ordered leaders of his army to select a capable person
to travel to Denmark to learn the true nature of the situation.325 His instructions
suggest he felt a need to obtain more detailed information then could be
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communicated by letter alone. He basically wanted a trusted individual to learn
personally from Duke Christian “how Duke Christian will use his forces…on land
and on water…so that we might better supply help and assistance and what else
might be needed against our enemies”326
The most significant aspect of sharing intelligence and warnings, however, is
that Gustav willingly kept to the agreements and wanted to assist the Danes when
possible. The Danes in turn shared information with Sweden, strengthening the
relationship between the two neighbors.
Sharing intelligence and warnings was an important aspect of SwedishDanish cooperation during the Count’s War. Another significant element related to
their military endeavors against Lübeck. Paludan-Müller offered a useful summary
of military aspects of the agreement of 1534, which set guidelines for numbers of
soldiers and ships to be at each other’s disposal, and financial responsibilities. In
case of an attack on Denmark, Sweden was to send 800 men including ships, and if
Sweden fell under attack, Denmark was to send 1000 men including ships; and all
soldiers would be paid and fed by the country supplying the help. If either Denmark
or Sweden was completely overpowered and the agreed help prove insufficient, then
they would supply as much military assistance as possible.327 Evidence suggests
military cooperation during the Count’s War accorded with the latter part of the
agreement.
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In July 1534, Vasa encouraged the Danes to send some of their ships to join
with the Swedish fleet at Kalmar.328 He reasoned that with reinforcement, his fleet
could do more damage to the enemy, and explained that his own ships were armed
and ready to sail, and hoped that assistance would come with the first favorable
wind.329 He also promised to support Denmark by land and sea to the very best of his
abilities.330 The following month, he responded promptly to a letter from the Danes
requesting help, and sent in soldiers:
We kindly remind you that the good men of the Danish National Council have…an
eternal league between these three kingdoms…Due to the events which are now
happening, that Lübeck, the enemy of these three kingdoms, has attacked
Denmark…we have, according to the same league, sent the most possible force, both by
horse and foot, to yours and Denmark’s National Council’s help and assistance…and
make it known to you that the noble Count and Lord Christian…have requested our
help… which we very much want to do.331

This passage shows that Vasa held to the agreement of 1534, but says nothing
concerning the number of horses and soldiers supplied at this time. In another
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instance, he referred to the fact that he had sent about six to eight ships, and there are
several other references to the deployment of soldiers and ships.332
Although it might be impossible to know for sure if Vasa did as much as he
possibly could to assist Denmark in the Count’s War, he suggested he had done his
best.333 The fact of the matter is that he managed to build a small but very efficient
navy by the time the Count’s War began. Together with the Danish and also the
Prussian fleet, they defeated Lübeck’s navy. Albrecht of Prussia, a Lutheran, had
diplomatic ties with Denmark through his marriage to Dorothea, daughter of
Frederik I, so when Vasa requested Albrecht send ships and soldiers to help his
brother-in-law in June 1534, he happily complied. His contribution to the fleet was
minimal, however, as only one of the two ships sent actually made it.334 The big
break came in the summer of 1535, when a combined Danish, Swedish and Prussian
fleet defeated Lübeck off Bornholm.335 For Lübeck, the loss at sea constituted a
naval disaster which ultimately marked its eventual defeat.336
An important element of the victory at sea came through the leadership of the
Danish Admiral Peder Skram, a man who has stood as an example of Danish
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heroism ever since.337 Skram came from a Danish noble family from southern
Jutland, and began his military career in his youth. He participated in military
expeditions, on land and sea, in both Norway and Sweden under Christian II and
Frederik I.338 By the time the Count’s War began, he had already made a name for
himself as a capable leader. Even Vasa knew of Skram and wrote, “we should get a
fine and capable man for an admiral or skipper for our fleet of ships…and mention
Peder Skram and praise him as a…clever soldier at sea.”339 As the war progressed,
Skram became Admiral of the Danish fleet, while Måns Svensson commanded the
Swedish ships. Vasa desired even a greater responsibility placed upon Skram’s
shoulders.340 After Vasa learned of the victory at sea, he wrote a letter of thanks:
Peder and other good men….God has given you victory…over our enemy, for which
we first and foremost will and should thank and praise God, our Father in Heaven…and
thank you all good men…for you faithfulness.341
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The leadership of Skram made a difference in the naval battles, and it appears Måns
Svensson also followed Skram’s tactics to defeat the enemy.342 It has been suggested
that Skram’s involvement had a decisive effect on the outcome of the war.343
Although he certainly played an important role in securing victory, the Count’s War,
however, most likely ended in Scandinavia’s favor because Sweden and Denmark
worked closely together to overcome a common enemy. Gustav Vasa and Christian
III of Denmark subsequently maintained a peaceful and cordial relationship until
their deaths in 1559 and 1560.
The period between 1533 and 1536 constituted a great example of how
Sweden and Denmark, former enemies, worked together to overcome an outside
threat only ten years after the end of the Kalmar Union. The correspondence of Vasa
indicates he wanted Denmark’s help to deal with Lübeck prior to the Count’s War,
and that Denmark responded reasonably well. Through correspondence and
diplomacy Vasa made significant efforts to further his relationship with Denmark
and therefore played an important part in establishing a close relationship. As events
unfolded, the two countries forged an agreement to assist each other in case of
foreign aggression, which secured their success in the Count’s War. This three-year
period is significant, then, because Sweden and Denmark managed to overcome
years of previous hostility. In fact, Sweden and Denmark built a mutual relationship
of respect and peace which lasted until 1563.
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Conclusion
Through a careful study and analysis of the sources, this thesis has shown, in
greater detail then presently available, some significant issues that prevailed in
Scandinavian history during the early sixteenth century. Frederik I intentionally
overpowered Norway by placing his own men in prominent political and military
positions throughout the country. The sources show how men like Hans Mule, Vincent
Lunge, Esge Bille, and Henrik Krummedige enjoyed such positions and gained
significant political influence at the cost of the authority of the Norwegian Council. This
directly violated the promises Frederik had given in his Norwegian charter, that as King,
he should rule Norway along with the Council, leaving the fortresses in Norwegian hands
and letting the Council appoint ecclesiastical leaders. This thesis has also presented
detailed insight into how Frederik’s men used their positions to futher their own political
or economical positions. Hans Mule and Esge Bille used violent means to achieve their
goals. These men, along with Vincent Lunge and Henrik Krummedige, did what they
could to gain land and financial benefits from their positions. This only helped to alienate
themselves from the Norwegians, who looked at them as outsiders, or at least not as
Norwegians.
Through the discussion of Denmark and Norway’s relationship during the reign of
Frederik I, it is clear that his policy regarding Norway succeeded. He managed to
surpress the Council but never completely dissolved it. This task was completed by his
son, Christian III, who obliterated it and permanently removed Norway’s political
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influence. The evidence provided show how Danish royalty managed to gain full control
of Norway within a thirteen year period.
Similar to the contribution on Denmark and Norway’s relationship, this thesis has
also portrayed how Denmark and Sweden, bitter enemies in the 1520s, developed a close
relationship of mutual friendship during the 1530s. The sources show how Gustav Vasa
and Frederik I worked together harmoniously on various issues even before the Count’s
War. Their mutual cooperation during the war resulted in victory over Lübeck, and gave
Vasa and Christian opportunities to set aside differences and establish a closer
relationship and peace between the two countries, at least until 1563, when new
leadership emerged.
Another significant outcome of the Count’s War which deserves to be mentioned
has to do with Lübeck. Due to its unsuccessful attempt to manipulate Denmark-Norway
politically, Lübeck suffered the consequences. Lübeck had enjoyed, many years previous
to the Count’s War, a prominent position in the Baltic both in regards to trade and
politics. It had in fact been the head of the influential confederation of Hansa and as such
enjoyed considerable privileges.344 After the war, however, Lübeck lost previous
privileges and considerations from others.345 Its political leadership in the North was
over.346 Much of its fleet had also been destroyed, but all was not lost. Lübeck managed
to maintain control over Bergen until the 1560’s, and continued to send ships through the
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Sound following the Count’s War.347 In 1537, Lübeck sent fifty ships through the Sound,
in 1538, thirty-four ships, and sixty-five in 1539.348 Between 1540 and 1560, Lübeck sent
516 ships through the sound, an annual average of 47.349 These numbers suggest that
Lübeck did indeed still participate in naval activities after the war and maintained a
merchant fleet. Lübeck also continued to play an important role in Sweden’s trade with
the rest of Europe, but never regained its former hegemony in the Baltic.350
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